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BEYOND THE ZONE OF TWILIGHT:  HOW 
CONGRESS AND THE COURT CAN MINIMIZE 
THE DANGERS AND MAXIMIZE THE 
BENEFITS OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS  
“Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and 
contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by 
Washington and Lincoln; and if this right is conceded . . . the 
dangers to human liberty are frightful to contemplate.” 1 
“In the event that Congress should fail to act, and act 
adequately, I shall accept the responsibility, and I will act.” 2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The government of the United States of America is at a precipice.  
The year is 2015 and the clash between the executive and legislative 
branches—forged in impeachment scandals of the 1990s and hardened 
during bitter debates over Iraq in the new century—continues to rage in 
the nation’s capital.   
The President is a lame duck in the last two years of her 
administration and, like all Presidents approaching retirement, she has 
become preoccupied with her legacy.  But the President knows that the 
chances of getting a piece of important legislation passed though a 
recalcitrant Congress at this point in her administration are slim.  Still, 
the President is determined to act, and act she does by issuing an 
executive order that will be her crowning achievement—an order that 
will move the country forward while avoiding the partisan politics and 
harsh resistance of Congress.  Harkening back to historic executive 
orders such as Harry Truman’s desegregation of the military and 
Thomas Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase, the President issues her order:  
“Executive boldness!” she thinks to herself.  
However, on Capital Hill, many members of Congress could not 
disagree more.  The leaders of the House and Senate feel as though their 
authority has been circumvented by a power-hungry President.  As they 
react to the executive order, remembering the effects of disastrous orders 
such as the internment of the Japanese during World War II, members of 
Congress cry, “Executive tyranny!”  
                                                 
1 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 125 (1866). 
2 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Address to Cong. (Sept. 7, 1943), in THE PUBLIC 
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 1942 v. 356, 364 (1942). 
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So who is right:  Congress or the President?  The answer to that 
question has varied throughout history, which is not surprising given 
the variety of executive orders that Presidents have issued.  For example, 
Presidents have waged war and established peace by executive order.3  
They have advanced both bigotry and equality with the stroke of a pen.4  
At times, Presidents have used executive orders to unilaterally draw a 
veil of secrecy over government actions; at other times Presidents have 
issued orders to investigate government corruption.5   
On the whole, however, executive orders are useful tools of the 
Presidency, subject to checks by Congressional vigilance and judicial 
oversight.  Yet too often executive orders are a little noticed caveat of 
governing, a footnote to history, ignored by Congress and the public.6  
This is troubling given that courts assess the legality of executive orders 
in terms of whether or not Congress has legislated on a particular 
subject, with orders frequently falling into an area the Court has termed 
the “zone of twilight,” in which Congress has neither approved nor 
disapproved of an executive order.7 
The purpose of this Note is to present measures by which Congress 
can move beyond the zone of twilight, effectively checking the 
President’s power to issue executive orders through:  (1) statutory 
changes that will make Congressional intent clear, (2) the codification of 
executive orders, which will lead to increased oversight, and (3) 
reframing the debate in terms of Presidential power not partisan 
politics.8  Part II will look at the history of executive orders from 
                                                 
3 See infra notes 26, 43 (describing President George Washington’s declaration of 
neutrality in 1793 and President Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of Habeas 
Corpus during the Civil War). 
4 See infra notes 75, 81 (describing Order 9066, authorizing the internment of Japanese 
Americans during World War II and Order 10730, which authorized the National Guard to 
facilitate the integration of Little Rock High School in 1957). 
5 See infra notes 36, 74 (describing President John Tyler’s executive order appointing 
private citizens to investigate alleged corruption in New York City’s Customshouse in 1842 
and Executive Order 8985, establishing the Office of Censorship during World War II). 
6 For example several studies of American politics offer scant information about 
executive orders.  See, e.g., CHRISTINE BARBOUR & GERALD C. WRIGHT, KEEPING THE 
REPUBLIC: POWER AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2001) (text on American politics 
mentioning executive orders six times throughout nearly 800 pages); SYDNEY M. MILKIS & 
MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: 1776-1998 (1999) (an exhaustive history of 
the presidency from 1776 to the present which does not even list executive orders in its 
index); NORMAN L. ROSENBURG & EMILY S. ROSENBURG, IN OUR TIMES: AMERICA SINCE 
WORLD WAR II (6th ed. 1999) (same). 
7 See infra note 88 (describing the Jackson test from Youngstown, the test courts use to 
assess the validity of executive orders). 
8 See infra Part IV. 
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President George Washington to President George W. Bush, including 
the Congressional and judicial response to various orders.9  Part III will 
examine whether executive orders are necessary parts of Presidential 
lawmaking and assess the efficacy of judicial determinations and 
Congressional oversight over the issuance of executive orders.10  Part IV 
will propose three ways in which Congress can ensure that executive 
orders continue to be effective mechanisms for Presidential power 
without becoming vehicles for executive abuse.11  Finally, Part V 
concludes with a brief summary.12  
II.  BACKGROUND 
Like all executive power, the ability of Presidents to issue executive 
orders has developed through past practice and judicial decisions.13  
Indeed, Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of executive orders has 
been called a “constitutional dialogue” between the executive and 
judicial branches.14  Moreover, an examination of the long history of 
executive orders reveals the measures that Congress and the courts can 
take today to minimize the danger of absolute Presidential power, while 
preserving the positive attributes of executive orders.15  
                                                 
9 See infra Part II. 
10 See infra Part III. 
11 See infra Part IV. 
12 See infra Part V. 
13 See KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 40-41 (2001).  Mayer discusses the imprecision of the language in 
Article II of the Constitution, detailing the powers of the Presidency.  Id. at 40.  Specifically, 
Mayer claims that not only  were the framers less than clear in detailing whether Presidents 
have implied powers, but Article II’s language is also quite brief, making a textual 
interpretation of Presidential powers difficult.  Id.  Accordingly, because of the meager 
enumeration of Presidential powers contained in the Constitution, Mayer argues that past 
practice of Presidents combined with judicial decisions have been the most important 
factors in determining today what actions are outside the purview of permissible 
Presidential powers.  Id. at 41. 
14 See PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE 
DIRECT ACTION 9-10 (2002).  Specifically, Cooper states that the constitutional dialogue is a 
conversation about policies, the presidency, the powers of the office, and the relationship 
between the presidency and other participants in the governing process.  Id. at 9.  Further, 
Cooper states that the dialogue, from time to time, has resulted in major Constitutional 
debates in the Courts.  Id.  The dialogue is further deepened and complicated when the 
President claims a statutory grant of authority from Congress that is being challenged in 
the courts.  Id. at 10.  Thus, in such instances, a dispute over an executive order results in a 
dialogue between all three branches of government.  Id. 
15 See infra Part IV (presenting three ways, including proposed legislation, in which 
Congress can be a powerful bulwark against Presidential abuse by executive order, 
including: (1) drafting legislation so that courts can clearly identify Congressional attempts 
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Thus, this Part will cover over 200 years of constitutional dialogue, 
tracing the rise of the modern presidency and encompassing some of the 
great political debates and judicial decisions of the past.16  First, this Part 
examines the early history of this dialogue, from its Constitutional roots 
to early executive orders and judicial challenges.17  Second, this Part 
considers the manner in which executive orders and court challenges 
were affected by the Civil War and Gilded Age that followed.18  Next, 
this Part focuses on how the dialogue changed with the advent of the 
modern presidency at the turn of the twentieth century through the duel 
crises of the Great Depression and World War II.19  Finally, this Part 
discusses how contemporary Presidents have used executive orders and 
how the Supreme Court has developed the modern judicial hurdle of 
challenging an executive order.20  
A. Executive Orders from Constitutional Roots Through the Dawn of the Civil 
War:  Congress Ignores Early Orders While the Court Firmly Establishes 
Statutory Supremacy 
In 1789, the framers drafted the United States Constitution and 
created an innovative institution:  the American Presidency.21  Though 
wary of creating too strong an executive figure, the framers drafted the 
Constitution such that the President possesses both express and implied 
                                                                                                             
to restrain the President, (2) codifying executive orders in order to increase oversight of 
Presidential power, and (3) framing the debate the debate over executive orders in terms of 
Presidential power instead of Presidential politics). 
16 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt’s executive order interring Japanese Americans during WWII); Little v. 
Barreme,  2 Cranch 170 (1804) (holding that President George Washington’s order allowing 
searches of American ships exceeded the congressional mandate); Chamber of Commerce 
of the United States v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (overturning President Bill 
Clinton’s executive order barring Federal contractors from hiring replacement workers for 
striking employees). 
17 See infra Part II.A. 
18 See infra Part II.B. 
19 See infra Part II.C. 
20 See infra Part II.D. 
21 Article II, Section 1 of the United States Constitution establishes the Presidency, 
stating, “[t]he executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America.”  U.S CONST. art. II, § 1.  See also Cass R. Sustein, An Eighteenth Century Presidency 
in a Twenty-First Century World, 48 ARK. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995) (stating that the establishment of 
the Presidency was a major Constitutional innovation, creating an Executive Branch for the 
new government when the Articles of Confederation had none); CATHERINE DRINKER 
BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 55 (1966) (stating that on June 1, 1789 when Charles 
Pinckney rose at the Constitutional Convention to propose a single executive—a President 
of the United States—his suggestion was met with a stunned silence from delegates, a 
“considerable pause” as scribe James Madison put it). 
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powers.22  The authority to issue executive orders is an implied power 
that has been used by Presidents dating back to George Washington.23  
Executive orders have allowed Presidents to do that which even the King 
of England could not:  bypass the legislative process by issuing orders 
that carry the force of law.24   
                                                 
22 See, e.g., In re Nagel, 135 U.S. 1, 81 (1890) (holding that the President has implied and 
express executive powers that are in no way dependant on legislation for their existence); 
see also Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary 
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1175-77 (1992).  Calabresi and Rhodes 
state that the vesting clause creating Congress in Article I—containing the language 
“herein granted”—differs from the Article II vesting clause creating the presidency, which 
has no such language.  Id. at 1175.  Further, Calabresi and Rhodes argue the difference 
between the two vesting clauses has incited much debate among constitutional 
interpreters.  Id. at 1177.  Specifically, some, known as Unitarians, read the clause as an 
affirmative grant of power allowing Presidents to govern all offices and officials in the 
executive branch, while others, known as non-unitarians, find the difference insignificant, 
arguing that the President should only have those powers enumerated elsewhere in Article 
II.  Id.  Yet, the prevailing interpretation of the vesting clauses allows Congress to act 
pursuant only to the legislative powers specifically enumerated in Article I, while the 
President may act in furtherance of all executive power, not simply the powers listed in the 
Constitution.  Id.  Indeed, since 1890 the Supreme Court has adopted the Unitarian 
approach, holding that the President has both express and implied powers.  But see Martin 
S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1791 (1996) (arguing against the 
unitary interpretation of the Constitution because the difference between the two vesting 
clauses was not a deliberate grant of implied powers, but was instead the result of “the 
exhaustion and impatience of delegates trying to wrap up their business.”). 
23 Executive orders have been defined in many different ways.  See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 610 (8th ed. 2004) (defining an executive order as “an order issued by or on 
behalf of the President, usually intended to direct or instruct the actions of executive 
agencies or government officials, or to set policies for the executive branch to follow”); 
Todd F. Gaziano, The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders and Other Presidential Directives, 5 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 267, 273 (2001) (defining executive orders as, “written, rather than oral, 
instructions or declarations issued by the President”); see also MAYER, supra note 13, at 4 
(defining executive orders as “Presidential directives that require or authorize some action 
within the executive branch” and “Presidential edicts”); infra note 26 (offering a discussion 
of George Washington’s 1793 Neutrality Proclamation, considered by many to be the first 
executive order). 
24 Many contend that the founders created a limited Presidency due to their experience 
with the British monarchy.  See, e.g., Michael S. Herman, Gubernatorial Executive Orders, 30 
RUTGERS L.J. 987, 988 (1999) (arguing that a British King—a model of executive power for 
the founding generation—could “issue binding proclamations to enforce laws of the 
realm”); Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern 
Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 11 (2002) (stating that the political theories of the founding 
generation, specifically their fear of unchecked executive power, were primarily shaped by 
the oppression they felt under the British monarchy).  But see COOPER, supra note 14, at 5 
(stating that at the time of the American Revolution, even King George III did not have the 
power to issue binding proclamations having the force of law on any subject of his 
choosing).  See generally, Proclamations [1610], 12 Eng. Rep. 74.  In the Proclamations case of 
1610, the King of England and his privy council sought the opinion of the King’s judges, 
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Though executive orders did not receive their name until well into 
the nineteenth century, most authorities agree that the first such order 
was an administrative order issued by George Washington in June of 
1789.25  However, President Washington’s most divisive order did not 
come until 1793 in the form of a Neutrality Proclamation, declaring that 
the United States would not get involved in the war between France and 
Britain.26  Significantly, though highly controversial, Congress never 
                                                                                                             
asking whether or not he had the authority to declare binding laws.  Id. at 74.  Specifically, 
the King wanted to restrict building in London and regulate the trade in starch.  Id.  Lord 
Coke, one of the presiding judges, argued that the King could not unilaterally declare 
either of the aforementioned rules law, stating, “[t]he King by his proclamation or other 
ways cannot change any part of the common law, or statute law, or the customs of the 
realm . . . also the King cannot create any offence by his prohibition or proclamation, which 
was not an offence before.”  Id. at 75.  Further, Lord Coke stated that his argument had an 
ancient basis, because all indictments under British law concluded by stating: Contra legem 
& consuetudinem (against the law and custom of England) or Contra leges & statute (against 
the laws and statutes).  However, no indictment ended with Contra Regiam proclamationem 
(against the royal proclamation).  Id.  Finally, Lord Coke argued that although British law 
was comprised of three elements: (1) the Common Law, (2) Statutory Law, and (3) Custom, 
Royal Proclamations fit into none of these categories and, accordingly, it is not malum 
prohibitum (wrong by reason of prohibition).  Id. at 76.  Accordingly, Lord Coke held that 
the King could not issue binding proclamations having the rule of law without 
Parliamentary approval.  Id. 
25 See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 13, at 51.  Mayer states that the first executive order was 
President Washington’s order instructing the acting officers of the Executive branch to 
prepare a report detailing their departmental affairs.  Id.  Mayer argues that this first 
executive order, like so many early orders, was merely a routine administrative procedure.  
Id.  See also Branum, supra note 24, at 23 (stating that the first executive order consisted of 
Washington instructing the acting officers of the Confederation government to prepare a 
report regarding the state of affairs in America); Gaziano, supra note 23, at 273 (same).  But 
see Leanna M. Anderson, Executive Orders, “The Very Definition of Tyranny,” and the 
Congressional Solution, the Separation of Powers Restoration Act, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 589 
(2002) (calling Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation of 1793 the first executive order). 
26 Issued by President Washington as a reaction to the war between France and the 
United Kingdom, the Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793 states that the “duty and interest 
of the United States require, that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and 
pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent Powers.”  See COOPER, supra 
note 14, at 123.  The proclamation went on to declare that U.S. citizens should avoid aiding 
or abetting either side of the conflict.  Id.  See generally JOSEPH J. ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY 
GEORGE WASHINGTON 222-23 (2004).  According to Ellis, Washington immediately 
recognized the danger that the war between Great Britain and Revolutionary France 
brought for the newly formed government of the United States.  Id. at 222.  Accordingly, 
when Washington received the news that war had broken out he convened his cabinet and 
got their unanimous support for an executive proclamation of neutrality, which was issued 
a week later.  Id.  See also MAYER, supra note 13, at 42 (stating that Congress was out of 
session when the hostilities broke out and Washington issued the Proclamation rather than 
call the body into an emergency session). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 11
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/11
2007] Beyond the Zone of Twilight 391 
overturned the Neutrality Proclamation.27  However, as history would 
soon illustrate, Congress was not the only check on Presidential power.28  
In 1804, the Supreme Court first weighed in on Presidential 
proclamations in Little v. Barreme.29  The executive order at issue in Little, 
a naval order that was issued pursuant to a Congressional grant of 
Presidential authority, conflicted with a statute.30  Firmly establishing the 
                                                 
27 See generally COOPER, supra note 14, at 122-24 (discussing the controversy surrounding 
the Proclamation).  Rather than the clear cut picture of a unanimous cabinet offered by 
Ellis, Cooper states that the battle over the Neutrality Proclamation “fractured the cabinet.”  
Id. at 122.  On one side was Washington’s former aide-de camp and current Secretary of the 
Treasury Alexander Hamilton, who argued passionately for the British cause.  Id. at 123.  
On the other side was Washington’s Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, who took the 
French side.  Id.  Furthermore, there was fervent popular support for both sides.  Id. at 122.  
Specifically, Cooper argues that many Americans still had deep hostilities toward the 
British on account of the Revolution, coupled with appreciation for the French, who had 
been America’s ally during the Revolution.  Id. at 123.  However, on the other hand there 
were Americans who did not support the French because they were horrified by the 
violence of the French Revolution.  Id.  Finally, though the neutrality proclamation declared 
no basis of authority to issue the order and it was feverishly challenged in Congress, the 
legislative branch eventually relented and, indeed, was eventually ratified by Congress.  Id.  
Thus, Cooper states that ultimately it was Washington who set the course for Neutrality 
and unilaterally declared it on April 22, 1793, over the protests of his cabinet, Congress, 
and the American people. Id. at 124. 
28 Though some have argued that George Washington was the first President to have an 
executive order challenged in court, the first judicial challenge did not come until 1804, 
nearly a decade after Washington’s Presidency ended and seven years after his death in 
1797.  See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 14, at 122-24 (stating that though the Neutrality 
Proclamation of 1973 was ultimately ratified by Congress,  President Washington issued 
numerous executive orders pursuant to enforcing the proclamation, one of which would go 
on to be at issue in Little v. Barreme).  But see Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (1804) (stating 
that the President had based his authority to issue an order on a 1799 statute). 
29 See Little, 2 Cranch at 170.  The war between Britain and France that had caused 
George Washington to issue the Neutrality Proclamation of 1793 was still raging on by the 
time John Adams became President in 1797.  See generally, Michael Duffy, World-Wide War 
and British Expansion 1793-1815, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE: VOLUME. II: 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 184-207 (1998).  For a discussion of President Adams’ 
involvement in the conflict, see generally DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS (2001).  See 
also MAYER, supra note 13, at 59.  Mayer states that Little v. Barreme originated with an 
executive order put forth by John Adams, ordering the navy to seize all vessels traveling to 
and from France.  Id.  A U.S. Navy Captain, acting pursuant to Adams’ order, seized a 
vessel of Danish origins the Atlantic Ocean.  Id.  The owners of the ship sued the Captain 
for damages.  Id. 
30 See Little, 2 Cranch at 170.  In Little, the Court noted the difference between the statute 
that Congress passed in 1799 authorizing the President to issue an executive order, and the 
actual order that was issued by John Adams that same year.  Id. at 177-78.  Specifically, 
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, noted that the statute suspended intercourse 
between the Unites States and France.  Id. at 177.  Further, the statute authorized the 
President to instruct naval Captains to stop any ship engaged in traffic counter to the Act 
and confiscate the ship if, “it should appear that such ship or vessel is bound, or sailing to 
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supremacy of statutes over executive orders, the Court held that the 
statute controlled and that the executive order was thus invalid.31  
The years that followed Little saw numerous executive orders 
unchallenged by Congress, most dealing with civil service issues and the 
disposition of public lands.32  Still, two important executive orders were 
issued prior to the Civil War.33  First, though seldom classified as such, 
President Thomas Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase had all the markings of 
an executive order, since it was done unilaterally by Presidential order 
without direct statutory or Constitutional authority.34  Significantly, 
neither Congress nor the public challenged the Louisiana Purchase on 
                                                                                                             
any port or place within the territory of the French republic.”  Id.  However, the court 
further noted that President Adams’ naval order was based on an overly broad 
construction of the statute, stating that Captains ought to, “do all that in you lies to prevent 
all intercourse…between the ports of the United States and those of France.”  Id. at 178 
(emphasis added).  Captain Little, responding to the President’s order, had stopped the 
Flying Fish thinking it was an American ship traveling from a French port.  Id. at 176. 
31 See id. at 177.  In Little, Justice Marshall wrote, “[i]t is by no means clear that the 
President of the United States. . . might not, without any special authority for that 
purpose. . . have empowered the officers commanding the armed vessels” to seize the 
Flying Fish.  Id.  Thus, the Court held that where the language of a statute conflicts with the 
language of an executive order, the statute controls.  Id. at 179.  Further, the Court held that 
the executive order not only failed to give Captain Little the right to seize the vessel, but it 
also did not excuse the Captain from personal liability for damages which he was forced to 
pay.  Id. 
32 See MAYER, supra note 13, at 51.  Mayer asserts that, until 1900, there were only 1,259 
executive orders issued.  Id.  Furthermore, Mayer explains that among these early orders 
were executive orders establishing Indian Reservations, townships, and setting aside land 
for the military.  Id. at 75. 
33 Many early executive orders are difficult to track down because they have never been 
compiled in a uniform volume.  See generally PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS vii (Clifford 
L. Lord ed., Archives Pub. Co. 1944) (noting that some topical compilations of early 
executive orders have been published, including collections on Civil Service orders, Indian 
Reservations, and Veterans Regulations). 
34 See MAYER, supra note 13, at 7.  See also, CALEB PERRY PATTERSON, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 143 (1953) (noting that President 
Jefferson initially thought a Constitutional Amendment was necessary in order for the 
Louisiana Purchase to be considered legal, not because the Purchase was outside of his 
executive power to enact, but because he initially did not think the addition of land was 
constitutional); STEVEN E. AMBROSE, UNDAUNTED COURAGE 72 (1996) (quoting President 
Jefferson responding to the French acquisition of New Orleans, stating, “[t]here is on the 
globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy.  It is New 
Orleans, through which the produce of three eighths of our territory must pass to 
market.”); E.M. HALLIDAY, UNDERSTANDING THOMAS JEFFERSON 138 (2001) (stating that 
when President Jefferson contemplated the thought of the French having possession of the 
Mississippi region, he unilaterally dispatched James Monroe to Paris with instructions to 
buy New Orleans and Florida from France, though the deal was later funded by Congress). 
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the grounds that it was issued without Congressional authority.35  
Second, President John Tyler began the tradition of establishing 
controversial independent Presidential commissions with executive 
orders when he issued an 1842 order calling for a commission to 
investigate corruption in the New York City Customshouse.36 
Thus, by the beginning of the Civil War, the practice of issuing 
executive orders was firmly established in American politics, and, 
although the Court had established the supremacy of statutes over 
executive orders, Congress was seldom willing to override an order.37  In 
the mid-1800s, as with modern executive orders, the Court had 
developed a framework for assessing the legality of executive orders; 
however, in order for the Court to effectively check Presidential power, 
Congress had to be proactive as well.38 
B. Executive Orders from the Civil War Until the Turn of the Century:  
Congress and the Courts Grant Presidents Expansive Power to Meet the 
Challenges of a Growing Nation 
During the Constitutional crises of the Civil War, executive orders 
were among the unprecedented executive powers Abraham Lincoln 
used to reunite the country, garnering a mixed judicial reaction.39  For 
                                                 
35 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952) (providing the 
argument of Justice Jackson in which he stated that the “Louisiana Purchase had nothing to 
do with the separation of powers as between the President and Congress, but only with 
state and federal power.  The Louisiana Purchase was subject to rather academic criticism, 
not upon the ground that Mr. Jefferson acted without authority from Congress, but that 
neither had express authority to expand the boundaries of the United States by purchase or 
annexation”). 
36 See MAYER, supra note 13, at 77-78.  In particular, Tyler’s order was significant not for 
its content but for the reaction it garnered in Congress.  Id.  Specifically, Mayer discusses 
President John Tyler’s executive order appointing private citizens to investigate alleged 
corruption in New York City’s Customshouse.  Id. at 77.  Seeking to block the order, 
Congress prohibited the President from paying for the commission until Congress 
appropriated the funds.  Id. at 78.  Further, Tyler’s Attorney General reaffirmed Congress’ 
authority to block funding, arguing that, though the President had the right to unilaterally 
create the council, he could not unilaterally fund it.  Id. at 78. 
37 See supra part II.A.  For a discussion of the expanse of Presidential power that 
occurred prior to the Civil War, particularly during the Presidency of Andrew Jackson, see 
MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 6, at 124-25 (arguing that although the Presidency of Andrew 
Jackson expanded opportunities for unilateral executive action, this expansion of power 
was dependant on the President’s popularity as a leader). 
38 See infra Part IV (presenting three ways that the modern Congress can be the first and 
most formidable check on Presidential power, so that courts can, in turn, apply the test the 
judiciary has developed in assessing the legality of executive orders). 
39 For the texts of some of Lincoln’s controversial executive orders, see generally 
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES AND STATE PAPERS 1827-2025 (Julius W. Muller ed., vol. vi 1917).  
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example, in the Prize Cases,40 the court affirmed President Lincoln’s 
power to establish a naval blockade by executive order.41  In contrast, in 
Ex parte Milligan,42 the Supreme Court declared President Lincoln’s 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus unconstitutional.43  Still, President 
                                                                                                             
For example, in February of 1862, Lincoln’s Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, issued an 
order in which the President granted amnesty for those who committed treason during the 
first year of the Civil War.  Id. at 1887-89.  The order outlined several of Lincoln’s more 
controversial 1861 orders and offered their justification, stating: 
Congress had not anticipated, and so had not provided for, the 
emergency. . . . The Judicial machinery seemed as if it had been 
designed, not to sustain the Government, but to embarrass and betray 
it. . . . In this emergency the President felt it his duty to employ with 
energy the extraordinary powers which the Constitution confides to 
him in cases of insurrection.  He called into the field such military and 
naval forces, unauthorized by the existing laws, as seemed necessary.  
He directed measures to prevent the use of the post-office for 
treasonable correspondence.  He subjected passengers to and from 
foreign countries to new passport regulations, and he instituted a 
blockade, suspended the writ of habeas corpus in various places, and 
caused persons who were represented to him as being or about to 
engage in disloyal and treasonable practices to be arrested by special 
civil as well as military agencies and detained in military custody 
when necessary to prevent them and deter others from such practices. 
Id. at 1888. 
40 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863). 
41 Id. at 668.  In the Prize Cases, four vessels, including cargo, were captured and 
confiscated by the United States as prizes of war.  Id. at 637.  The owners of the vessels 
brought suit, alleging that the President did not have the authority to establish the 
blockade.  Id.  The President claimed that the authority for the blockade was found in the 
Act of 1807, allowing him to use the Army and Navy during war.  Id. at 642.  Noting that 
the President acted before Congress had convened, the Court stated that the order rested 
solely upon his authority.  Id. at 643.  Further, the court noted that the mere fact that 
Congress later affirmed the blockade did not serve to retroactively recognize its validity.  
Id. at 647.  Thus, the Court stated that the legality of the blockade necessitated an asking 
whether or not the President had the authority to declare it on his own.  Id. at 648.  
Ultimately, the court affirmed President Lincoln’s authority to declare the blockade, 
stating, “[i]f a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only 
authorized, but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to 
accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority.”  Id. at 668. 
42 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). 
43 Id. at 126.  In Milligan, Indiana resident Lamdin Milligan was arrested in October of 
1864 and was tried on charges of conspiracy against the government and of offering aid to 
rebels.  Id. at 6.  After Milligan was found guilty and sentenced to death by hanging, he 
raised objection to his trial, arguing that there had been no indictment against him.  Id. at 7.  
The Court noted that Congress had passed a statute allowing Lincoln the authority to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus in 1863.  Id. at 115.  In powerful language the court 
stated, “[n]o graver question was ever considered by this court, nor one which more nearly 
concerns the rights of the whole people; for it is the birthright of every American citizen 
when charged with a crime, to be tried and punished according to the law.”  Id. at 118.  
Furthermore, with regard to the Writ of habeas corpus, the court reasoned that, “[w]icked 
men, ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place 
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Lincoln’s executive orders were accepted by both Congress and the 
public as legitimate Presidential actions, in spite of the Court’s rulings, 
due to the unique circumstances of the Civil War.44  
Subsequent to President Lincoln’s term in office, a series of cases in 
the late nineteenth century served to affirm broad Presidential power in 
the area of executive orders.45  First, in 1890, the Court affirmed the 
President’s ability to take independent action in order to execute a law in 
In re Neagle.46  Two years later, in Jenkins v. Collard,47 the Court stated that 
executive orders have the force of law so long as they are based upon 
legitimate constitutional or statutory authority.48  Finally, in an 1895 case, 
In re Debs,49 the Court reaffirmed the broad support for independent 
executive action that it had upheld in Neagle by affirming the ability of 
                                                                                                             
once occupied by Washington and Lincoln; and if this right is conceded, and the calamities 
of war again befall us, the dangers to human liberty are frightful to contemplate.”  Id. at 
125.  Accordingly, the court held that although the writ of habeas corpus may be 
suspended and a person may be held without a formal indictment, a citizen cannot be tried 
without one.  Id. at 126. 
44 See, e.g., GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, JR., THE PRESIDENCY IN THE COURTS (1973) (noting 
that even in Ex parte Milligan, where the Court declared unconstitutional Lincoln’s 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the Court did not hand down the decision until 
after the Civil War had ceased, and thus had no practical ramifications for Lincoln). 
45 See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. 
46 In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).  Neagle concerned the authority of a President to 
empower a United States Marshall to act in defense of a specific person.  Id.  Specifically, 
David Terry had made threats against Supreme Court Justice Steven Field.  Id. at 46.  
President Benjamin Harrison responded to the threat by allowing his Attorney General to 
charge David Neagle, a United States Deputy Marshall, with the task of protecting Justice 
Field.  Id. at 48.  Subsequently, at a breakfast, a murderous assault was made by Terry 
toward Justice Field, at which point Neagle shot and killed him.  Id. at 53.  Terry was later 
charged with homicide, but was released after the circuit court granted a writ of habeas 
corpus.  Id. at 41.  The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the President had the 
authority to grant Neagle the power to defend Justice Field.  Id. at 40.  However, the Court 
went on to state that while it is the duty of the President to execute the laws, he cannot 
create them.  Id. at 83.  Accordingly, though the Court held that the President had 
independent authority in executing the laws, it also affirmed that he was constrained by 
both the Constitution and Congressional statutes regarding what laws he may enforce.  Id. 
47 Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U.S. 546. 
48 Id. at 560.  Jenkins dealt with a Confederate property owner whose Ohio property had 
been confiscated during the Civil War.  Id. at 552.  Thereafter the Property owner had been 
pardoned by the general Presidential Pardon of 1868.  Id. at 557.  The Supreme Court was 
called upon to decide whether the pardon had the effect of restoring the property to its 
original owner.  Id.  The court ultimately held that the former confederate did retain an 
interest in the property, thus reaffirming the authority of the President to issue binding 
proclamations.  Id. at 560.  Specifically, the court stated that, “pardon and amnesty were 
made by a public proclamation of the President, which has the force of public law, and of 
which all courts and officers must take notice, whether especially called to their attention or 
not.”  Id. 
49 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
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the Attorney General to take injunctive action against those who violate 
the laws of the United States.50  Taken together, these decisions typified 
the Court’s willingness to grant Presidents expansive power in order to 
meet the challenges of an increasingly powerful, growing nation.51 
In sum, though the late nineteenth century is generally seen as an era 
of Congressional, rather than Presidential supremacy, Presidents exerted 
executive power by issuing executive orders that were, in turn, met with 
Congressional and judicial acceptance.52   
C. Executive Orders from 1900 to World War II:  With the Advent of the 
Modern Executive Order the Court Struggles to Develop a Test and 
Congress Focuses on Politics Rather Than Policy 
As the power of the Presidency expanded during the beginning of 
the twentieth century, so too did Presidents’ willingness to use executive 
orders to achieve various ends.53  For example, Theodore Roosevelt 
                                                 
50 Id. at 599.  Debs concerned striking railroad workers violating the Interstate Commerce 
Clause.  Id. at 546.  Specifically, the Attorney General of the U.S. acquired an injunction 
against union leaders, claiming that the strike violated the Interstate Commerce Clause by 
forcible obstructing commerce.  Id. at 577.  The Supreme Court upheld the Attorney 
General’s authority to take such an action, stating: 
in the exercise of those powers it is competent for the nation to remove 
all obstructions upon highways, natural or artificial, to the passage of 
interstate commerce or the carrying of the mail [and] . . . it may be 
competent for the government (through the executive branch and in 
the use of the entire executive power of the nation) to forcibly remove 
all such obstructions. 
Id. at 599.  For further discussion of executive orders and nineteenth century railroad 
interests, see generally Menotti v. Dillon, 167 U.S. 703 (1897) (holding that Congress could, 
with appropriate legislation, overcome an executive order that withdrew land from the 
private domain for the development of a railroad). 
51 See, e.g., Neagle, 135 U.S. at 40 (affirming the President’s power to oversee law 
enforcement); Jenkins, 145 U.S. at 560 (affirming the President’s power to issue 
proclamations affecting property ownership); Debs 158 U.S. at 577 (affirming the 
President’s power to enforce the Commerce Clause). 
52 See RICHARD J. ELLIS, SPEAKING TO THE PEOPLE, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 112 (1998) (describing the era from the end of Lincoln’s 
presidency in 1865 until the beginning of President Roosevelt’s presidency in 1901 as an 
“era of congressional government” and a time of “arrested development for the 
presidency”). 
53 Also, by the turn of the century, the publishing and cataloging of executive orders had 
become much more established.  See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 14, at 17 (stating that in 1873, 
President Ulysses S. Grant issued an executive order in which the organized form for 
executive orders was outlined); see also PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS supra note 33, at 
vii (stating that beginning in 1895, the U.S government published a Documentary Catalog, 
which listed each executive order in slip form and made them available in depository 
libraries across the country). 
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promoted his progressive agenda using executive orders to make the 
civil service more inclusive and encourage conservation by setting aside 
public land.54  President Taft continued the trend of setting land aside, 
even without the statutory authority that Congress had been unwilling 
to provide.55  Significantly, in U.S. v Midwest Oil Co.,56 the Court upheld 
Taft’s decision to issue an executive order without Congressional 
authority, holding that Congress had “acquiesced” to Taft’s authority by 
failing to act itself.57  Known as the “acquiescence doctrine[,]” the Court’s 
                                                 
54 See PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS, supra note 33, at 37.  Among the numerous 
executive orders issued by President Theodore Roosevelt regarding conservation was 357, 
issued on October 10, 1905 which created three bird sanctuaries.  Id. at 37.  Additionally, 
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 984 on December 1, 1908.  Id. at 91.  The order served to 
admit “deaf mutes to examinations for all classified civil service posts for which they are 
qualified.”  Id.  Significantly, this was one of the first accommodations the United States 
government would make toward those who are handicapped, and it was done via 
executive order.  For a discussion of Theodore Roosevelt’s efforts create national parks and 
national monuments, see generally PAUL RUSSELL CUTRIGHT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: THE 
MAKING OF A CONSERVATIONIST 225-27 (1985) (listing all of the parks and monuments 
created during Roosevelt’s tenure and stating that the President got his authority to set 
aside land from the Antiquities Act of 1906, which allowed the President, at his discretion, 
to set aside lands for national monuments). 
55 See, e.g., U.S. v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).  In Midwest Oil, President Taft 
withdrew from the private domain three million acres of land that contained large deposits 
of oil.  Id. at 466.  However, both sides agreed that Taft had no statutory authority to do so.  
Id.  See also respondents brief, stating: 
President Taft himself doubted his authority when he stated. . .  that 
unfortunately Congress had not fully acted on the recommendations of 
the executive; that the question as to what the executive should do was 
full of difficulty; and that he thought it the duty of Congress by statute 
to validate withdrawals made by the Secretary of Interior and the 
President, and to authorize the Secretary temporarily to withdraw 
lands pending submission to Congress of recommendations as to 
legislation to meet conditions of emergencies as they arise. 
Id. 
56 Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 459. 
57 Id. at 459.  The plaintiffs in Midwest Oil Co., a private oil company, claimed that the 
President had no authority to issue the executive order withdrawing land from the private 
domain and brought suit seeking to recover the land.  Id. at 468.  The Court noted past 
Presidential latitude in issuing executive orders regarding public lands, stating: “Congress 
did not repudiate the power claimed or the withdrawal orders made.  On the contrary it 
uniformly and repeatedly acquiesced in the practice and, as shown by these records, there 
had been, prior to 1910, at least 252 Executive Orders making reservations for useful, 
though non-statutory purposes.”  Id. at 471.  The court held that several factors led to the 
conclusion that the President had the power to issue the order, including: (1) the long-
continued practice, (2) the acquiescence of Congress, and (3) the decisions of the courts.  Id. 
at 483. 
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holding would come to be an important method for upholding executive 
orders in the face of legislative unwillingness to act.58  
The trend of expansive Presidential power continued during World 
War I, when Woodrow Wilson issued a series of executive orders that 
increased economic regulation and facilitated the execution of the war.59  
However, in the 1920s executive orders caused an enormous national 
scandal when President Warren G. Harding issued an order that 
transferred land from the government to a cabinet official in a debacle 
known as the Teapot Dome Scandal.60  Significantly, throughout the 
scandal, Congress focused on the politics of the day rather than the 
larger question of whether the President should have the power to issue 
executive orders at all.61 
                                                 
58 Id. at 472-73 (1915).  In justifying the acquiescence doctrine in Midwest Oil Co., Justice 
Lamar explained: 
But government is a practical affair intended for practical men. Both 
officers, law-makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any 
long-continued action of the Executive Department—on the 
presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to 
be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice.  That 
presumption is not reasoning in a circle but the basis of a wise and 
quieting rule that in determining the meaning of a statute or the 
existence of a power, weight shall be given to the usage itself—even 
when the validity of the practice is the subject of investigation. 
Id. 
59 See generally, PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS, supra note 33, at v.  Among the 
Executive orders issued by President Wilson during WWI were orders creating the Food 
Administration, the War Trade Board, and the Committee on Public Information.  Id.  
Additionally, Wilson issued orders regulating wartime radio broadcasting and detailing 
the duties of conscientious objectors.  Id. 
60 The most notable executive order during the 1920s was the impetus for the infamous 
Teapot Dome scandal of the Harding Administration.  For a detailed description of the 
Teapot Dome Scandal, see BURL NOGGLE, TEAPOT DOME: OIL AND POLITICS IN THE 1920S 
(1962).  In particular, Noggle states that the land transfer from the public to a member of 
the Harding Administration took place because of an executive order signed by President 
Harding.  Id. at 19.  Additionally, Noggle notes that during the Senate Investigation of the 
scandal, attention focused largely on the partisan political gains that could result from the 
scandal.  Id. at 64-95. 
61 See, e.g., Warm Controversy Starts, N.Y. TIMES, January 28, 1924, at A1 (stating 
Congressional concern days after the scandal broke focused on the President preempting a 
Congressional announcement for the purpose of political gain by calling for an 
independent investigation of the scandal); Republican Organ Urges Prosecution, N.Y. TIMES, 
January 26, 1924, at A1 (citing Republican concern with how the scandal would affect the 
public’s perception of the Harding Administration); The President is Aroused, N.Y. TIMES, 
January 26, 1924, at A1 (in which the President reacts to the Teapot Dome Scandal without 
mentioning that the scandal was caused by an executive order). 
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Not surprisingly, given the Congressional response to the scandal, 
Teapot Dome did little to curtail the President’s ability to issue executive 
orders and the Court continued to weigh in on the subject.62  First, in 
Myers v. U.S.,63 the court upheld the President’s ability to remove 
executive branch officials by executive order without Congressional 
advice.64  Second, in J.W. Hampton Co. v. U.S.,65 the Court held that, when 
granting authority to the President, Congress must set a standard to 
which the President must adhere in issuing executive orders.66  Notably, 
                                                 
62 See, e.g., Branum, supra note 24, at 9 (noting that “[t]he first twenty-four Presidents 
issued 1262 executive orders.  The last seventeen Presidents (not including the current Bush 
administration) issued 11,855 orders”). 
63 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
64 Id. at 176.  In Myers, a postmaster was dismissed by an executive order.  Id. at 106.  The 
former postmaster sued the government, claiming that his dismissal violated an 1876 
statute, stating “[p]ostmasters of the first, second and third classes shall be appointed and 
may be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and 
shall hold their offices for four years unless sooner removed or suspended according to 
law.”  Id. at 107.  In particular the Court stated, “[t]he general doctrine of our Constitution 
then is, that the executive power of the nation is vested in the President; subject only to the 
exceptions and qualifications, which are expressed in the instrument.”  Id. at 138.  
Accordingly, because the Constitution was silent as to the process by which civil servants 
ought to be dismissed, the Court declared the statute unconstitutional and held that the 
President had the authority to remove the Postmaster without Senatorial consent.  Id. at 
176. 
65 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
66 Id. at 409.  In Hampton, the plaintiff challenged an executive order concerning import 
duties that set the amount two cents higher than that stipulated in a Congressional Statute.  
Id. at 400.  However, the statute also declared that the President had the authority to 
modify the duty if he found it was inadequate.  Id at 401.  The Court held that the statute at 
issue was constitutional because Congress acted within its authority when it gave the 
President the power to increase the tariff.  Id. at 407.  Specifically, the Court reasoned that 
the Congressional grant of authority was constitutionally proper because it was not 
abdicating its legislative responsibilities.  Id.  Further, the Court compared Congress’ 
delegation of authority to the executive branch to a referendum, stating: 
Congress may feel itself unable conveniently to determine exactly 
when its exercise of the legislative power should become effective, 
because dependent on future conditions, and it may leave the 
determination of such time to the decision of an Executive, or, as often 
happens in matters of state legislation, it may be left to a popular vote 
of the residents of a district to be effected by the legislation.  While in a 
sense one may say that such residents are exercising legislative power, 
it is not an exact statement, because the power has already been 
exercised legislatively by the body vested with that power under the 
Constitution, the condition of its legislation going into effect being 
made dependent by the legislature on the expression of the voters of a 
certain district. . . .  “The true distinction, therefore, is, between the 
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a 
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or 
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance 
Wetzel: Beyond the Zone of Twilight: How Congress and the Court can Minim
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
400 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
only twice since J.W. Hampton has the Court held that Congress has 
failed to outline such a standard, both of which occurred during the 
1930s.67 
The increase in executive orders at the beginning of the twentieth 
century pales in comparison to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
use of them during the Great Depression and World War II.  As orders 
began affecting more and more Americans, many began calling for 
greater access to orders in order to facilitate greater oversight.68  During 
the Great Depression, the Court initially responded to the flurry of New 
Deal executive orders by reiterating the fact that Congress cannot 
delegate its legislative authority to the President.69  This became known 
                                                                                                             
of the law.  The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can 
be made.” 
Id.  Additionally, the Court noted that Congress had established a specific guideline for the 
executive branch to follow in issuing executive orders.  Id. at 409.  Accordingly, because (1) 
Congress was within it authority to delegate power to the executive branch and (2) 
Congress laid down an intelligible principle by which the executive branch should proceed, 
the Congressional delegation and subsequent executive order were constitutional.  Id. at 
409. 
67 See infra note 69 (describing the Court’s decision in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., one 
of the two times in history that the Court has held that an executive order was invalid 
because Congress failed to set a standard to which the President must adhere). 
68 See COOPER, supra note 14, at 40-41.  Cooper states that FDR issued 3,723 executive 
orders during his twelve years as President.  Id. at 41.  Additionally, Roosevelt’s executive 
orders heralded significant policy measures, such as the bank holiday he declared two days 
after taking office.  Id. at 40.  Furthermore, Cooper points out that Congress granted the 
President the broad authority to issue executive orders of great importance when it passed 
a statute granting FDR war-like powers.  Id. at 40.  See also, PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 2, at 
364 (quoting Roosevelt as saying, “[i]n the event that Congress should fail to act, and act 
adequately, I shall accept the responsibility, and I will act”); FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT: A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 93 (1990) (noting that FDR modeled his 
executive style during the Great Depression on Woodrow Wilson’s use of executive power 
during WWI).  See generally MAYER, supra note 13, at 69 (noting that by the 1930s Harvard 
Law professor Erwin Griswold called for an official gazette that would serve as notification 
to the public of executive orders).  Today, Executive Orders are published in the Code of 
Federal Regulations alongside agency rules.  See 2 CFR § 1 (2006) (providing an annual list 
of all Executive Orders issued for a particular year). 
69 During the 1930s, two cases found an improper Congressional delegation of authority, 
both of which involved the National Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”).  See Panama 
Refining Co. v Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).  Panama involved the legality of a 1933 executive 
order that prohibited interstate and foreign commerce of oil that had been illegally 
withdrawn from the ground.  Id. at 406.  The Court held that the portion of NIRA that gave 
the President the authority to issue the order was an invalid grant of Legislative authority.  
Specifically, the court stated: 
It would be idle to pretend that anything would be left of limitations 
upon the power of the Congress to delegate its law-making function.  
The reasoning of the many decisions we have reviewed would be 
made vacuous and their distinctions nugatory.  Instead of performing 
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as the “non-delegation doctrine.”70  The Court also emphasized that it 
was necessary for a President to identify a specific statutory or 
constitutional basis for executive orders.71  Lastly, the Court reacted to 
the poor record of public notification of executive orders that had 
increasingly important ramifications for Americans.72 
                                                                                                             
its law-making function, the Congress could at will and as to such 
subjects as it chose transfer that function to the President or other 
officer or to an administrative body.  The question is not of the intrinsic 
importance of the particular statute before us, but of the constitutional 
processes of legislation which are an essential part of our system of 
government 
Id. at 430.  Furthermore, the Court found that Congress had declared no policy, had 
established no standard, and had laid down no rule regarding how the President was to 
regulate petroleum.  Id. at 415.  See also, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495 (1935).  Schechter involved an alleged violation of the live Poultry code, a code 
promulgated under NIRA.  Id. at 521.  NIRA gave the President the authority to approve of 
codes of fair competition submitted by trade groups, requiring him to: (1) find that the 
trade or industrial group which propose a code, “impose no inequitable restrictions on 
admission to membership therein and are truly representative” and (2) find that the code is 
not “designed ‘to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will 
not operate to discriminate against them.”  Id. at 846.  The court found the grant of 
authority to be an unconstitutional delegation of Legislative power, even during the 
economic crises of the Great Depression, stating, “[e]xtraordinary conditions may call for 
extraordinary remedies.   But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify 
action which lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority.  Extraordinary conditions 
do not create or enlarge constitutional power.”  Id. at 528.  For a discussion of President 
Roosevelt’s reaction to the Schechter decision, see FREIDEL, supra note 68, at 163 (discussing a 
May 31, 1935 press conference held by FDR in which he analyzed the Schechter decision, 
worrying not about the court’s holding concerning an unconstitutional delegation of 
power, but instead expressing concern about the Court’s narrow interpretation of federal 
regulatory power); see also MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 6, at 272 (noting that New Dealers 
referred to May 27, 1935, the day the Schechter decision was handed down, as “Black 
Monday”). 
70 See Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 433 (“We cannot regard the President as immune 
from the application of . . . constitutional principles.  When the President is invested with 
legislative authority as the delegate of Congress in carrying out a declared policy, he 
necessarily acts under the constitutional restriction applicable to such a delegation”); Brief 
for Petitioner, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) 
(“[P]rivate citizens directly affected are entitled to have Congress . . . declare definite 
standards which are capable of guiding administrative action and properly restricting it, 
and to have provision made for quasi-judicial administrative procedure properly 
conforming to due process of law. Otherwise dictatorship is surely here . . .”). 
71 See Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 432.  In Panama, in addition to finding that the 
order was an invalid delegation of legislative power, the Court found that President 
Roosevelt’s executive order was invalid because it did not contain any statement of 
constitutional or statutory authority.  Id. at 432.  Specifically, the court stated that without a 
statement of authority the President would have had “uncontrolled legislative power.”  Id. 
72 As executive orders shifted from the civil service orders of the nineteenth century to 
the more significant orders of the New Deal era, poor public notice and draftsmanship of 
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Additionally, during the Roosevelt administration, the Second 
World War brought about two significant developments concerning 
executive orders.73  First, FDR firmly established Presidential supremacy 
in the area of intelligence when he issued Executive Order 8955, 
establishing the Office of Censorship which controlled communications 
from the United States to foreign countries.74  Second, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
executive orders became an issue of great concern.  See United States v. Smith, 293 U.S. 633 
(1934) (attempting to prosecute an individual for violating the National Recovery 
Administration, but dismissed prior to oral arguments at the request of the Solicitor 
General of the United States due to the fact that an executive order had inadvertently 
dropped the language that empowered the government to prosecute individuals such as 
the defendant); see also MAYER, supra note 13, at 68-69.  Mayer noted that the Smith case 
serves as “a metaphor for the legal chaos that stemmed from the lack of coordination and 
effective record keeping of administrative actions and executive orders . . .”  Id. at 68.  
Specifically, Mayer explains that Smith arose out of the National Recovery Administration 
(“NRA”) which, according to statute, set codes of fair competition for private industries.  
Id.  One month after the NRA set quotas for the oil industry in August of 1933, President 
Roosevelt issued an executive order amending the oil provision in order to disallow the 
transfer of illegally produced oil across state lines.  Id.  Meanwhile, the Department of 
Justice brought suit against an individual for violating the NRA code.  Id. at 69.  The case 
went up to the Supreme Court, at which time a government attorney realized that 
Roosevelt’s executive order had dropped the enforcement language from the code.  Id.  
Thus, the government was trying to prosecute Smith for violating a law that did not exist.  
Id. 
73 It should be noted that prior to WWII, the court had already granted the President 
wide latitude in issuing executive orders in the area of national security.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).  In Curtiss-Wright, President 
Roosevelt issued an executive order pursuant to a statute in which he declared illegal the 
sale of arms to Bolivia, which was then in a state of war.  Id. at 312.  Appellees were 
charged with conspiracy to sell arms to Bolivia and appealed, arguing that the executive 
order was an invalid delegation of legislative power.  Id. at 314.  However, in a strong 
assertion of Presidential power, the Court held that the President had the authority to issue 
the order.  Id. at 333.  In particular, the Court emphasized the President’s constitutionally 
granted power in international affairs, stating: 
[T]he very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as 
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international 
relations- a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an 
act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental 
power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions 
of the United States Constitution. . . . [C]ongressional legislation which 
is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the 
international field must often accord to the President a degree of 
discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be 
admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.  Moreover, he, not 
Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which 
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. 
Id. at 320.  See also MAYER, supra note 13, at 50 (referring to the Curtiss-Wright decision as 
laying out, “a sweeping theory of inherent Presidential prerogative in foreign affairs”). 
74 See Exec. Order No. 8985, 6 Fed. Reg. 6625 (Dec. 23, 1941) (establishing the Office of 
Censorship).  See also Exec. Order No. 8381, 5 Fed. Reg. 1147 (Mar. 26, 1940) (empowering 
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lent validity to one of the most reprehensible executive orders ever 
issued when it affirmed the President’s ability to have Japanese-
Americans placed in internment camps during World War II.75  
Significantly, Congress also affirmed the internment plan; had they 
overturned the order by statute, the internment of Japanese-Americans 
never would have taken place.76 
Thus, from the beginning of the twentieth century until WWII, the 
Court’s treatment of executive orders mirrored shifts in national mood, 
with the public favoring an active Presidency during World War I as the 
Court enunciated the broad acquiescence doctrine, and a more limited 
                                                                                                             
civilians in defense agencies to classify certain vital military and naval installations and 
equipment); Exec. Order No. 9182, 7 Fed. Reg. 4468 (June 16, 1942) (consolidating certain 
war information functions into the Office of War Information, which brought all 
government information functions under one organization).  See also MAYER, supra note 13, 
at 144. Mayer describes FDR’s executive orders concerning classification and national 
security as a major increase toward Presidential hegemony.  Id.  First in 1940, Roosevelt 
issued Executive Order 8381, allowing civilians in defense agencies the authority to classify 
documents.  Id.  Next, only weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt 
issued an executive order establishing the Office of Censorship, which controlled 
communications from the United States to foreign countries.  Id.  Finally, in 1942 Roosevelt 
issued an executive order consolidating all government information offices into the Office 
of War Information.  Id.  Mayer argues that each of these orders served to increase 
Presidential authority in the area of intelligence and government classification.  Id. 
75 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  In Korematsu, the Court affirmed 
Executive Order 9066, issued by FDR on February 19, 1942 for the purpose of interring 
Japanese Americans during WWII.  Id. at 217.  In declaring that the executive order was 
constitutional, the Court stated, “[c]ompulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from 
their homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with 
our basic governmental institutions.  But when under conditions of modern warfare our 
shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with 
the threatened danger.”  Id. at 219.  See also Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 
1942) (authorizing the internment by stating that, “successful prosecution of the war 
requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-
defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities”); 56 Stat. 173 
(1942) (codifying the executive order and outlining the penalty for violating restrictions or 
orders with respect to persons entering, remaining in, leaving, or committing any act in 
military areas or zones).  See also COOPER, supra note 14, at 78.  Cooper states that as a result 
of the order, 117,000 Japanese-Americans were placed in camps.  Id.  Additionally, Cooper 
points out that Roosevelt cited no authority for the order other than his role as commander-
in-chief.  Id.  Furthermore, though the President issued the executive order, and the Court 
affirmed it, Congress also lent its approval to the internment when it passed a statute 
affirming the order later in 1942.  Id.  Thus, all three branches of government approved of 
one of the most shameful government actions of the twentieth century.  Id. 
76 See infra Part III.A (arguing that the practice of issuing executive orders is not per se 
flawed simply because an order has the potential for abuse, because: (1) like the Japanese 
internment, the order would have been passed and brought into existence even in the 
absence of unilateral executive power; or (2) the order can and should be superceded by 
Congress). 
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government during the 1920s when the Court enforced the restrictive 
non-delegation doctrine.77  Therefore, by the 1940s the Court recognized 
both broad Presidential power in issuing executive orders, as well as the 
competing need for Congressional oversight.78 
D. Executive Orders from 1945 to Present:  The Court Develops the Jackson 
Test, as Congress Unsuccessfully Attempts Oversight, and Presidents 
Continue to Issue Significant Executive Orders  
As World War II came to a close, many of the civil rights issues that 
had been simmering just under the surface during the war came to a 
boil.79  During this period, it was primarily through executive orders that 
Presidents were able to make early civil rights strides.80  For example, in 
                                                 
77 See MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 6, at 196-259 (detailing the expansive vision of 
Presidential power espoused by Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson followed by 
“The Triumph of Conservative Republicanism” during the 1920s, including limited 
government and a less active presidency). 
78 But see MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 6, at 273 (arguing that with the Court’s 
enunciation of the non-delegation doctrine, Roosevelt lost the battle but won the war 
because, “[m]ost of the judicial barriers to national and Presidential power . . . have 
fallen”); see also COOPER, supra note 14, at 23 (stating that since the Court has been unwilling 
to impose the non-delegation doctrine as a check on Presidential power since the New 
Deal, it is doubtful that the doctrine could be used today to challenge an executive order). 
79 See ROSENBURG & ROSENBURG, supra note 6, at 35-37.  The Rosenburgs describe civil 
rights during the Truman era.  Id.  Specifically, Rosenburg and Rosenburg argue World 
War II changed what Americans thought about civil rights, stating, “[r]evulsion against 
Nazi racism had helped to produce a backlash against discrimination at home; wartime 
economic gains had encouraged civil-rights groups to mount new attacks on 
discrimination; and scattered outbreaks of racial violence immediately after the war had 
intensified efforts to calm racial tensions.”  Id. at 35.  Further, the Rosenburgs detail 
President Truman’s ambitions civil rights agenda, including: a ban on poll taxes, an anti-
lynching law, and employment legislation.  Id. 
80 See MAYER, supra note 13, at 182-217.  Mayer traces the history of executive orders and 
civil rights.  Id.  First, Mayer notes that although Presidents did little to further civil rights 
in the beginning of the twentieth century, the Presidency was still looked upon as the key 
authority for change.  Id. at 186.  The reason for this was because “[b]y the 1930s . . . 
legislative hostility to significant civil rights legislation was firmly entrenched, largely a 
function of southern opposition to federal intervention of any kind.”  Id.  Mayer further 
notes that while the New Deal initially offered few civil rights progressions, there were a 
few, such as a 1935 Executive order prohibiting race discrimination in the Works Progress 
Administration.  Id. at 187.  Six years later in 1941, President Roosevelt established the Fair 
Employment Pracitices Committee (“FEPC”) through executive order, which sought to end 
race discrimination in employment.  Id.  Though FEPC had questionable success, it did set 
off a great battle between the executive and legislative branch over the extent of executive 
autonomy in creating agencies through executive authority.  Id. at 189.  Mayer explains that 
FEPC was created out of executive order but funded outside the normal appropriations 
process with emergency funds assigned to the President to use at his discretion.  Id.  In 
response to FEPC, Senator Richard Russel of Georgia sponsored an amendment to restrict 
the President’s ability to spend money on agencies created by executive agency.  Id.  
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1948, President Truman issued an executive order desegregating the 
United States Military.81  A decade later, in 1957, President Eisenhower 
issued an executive order calling in the National Guard to facilitate the 
peaceful integration of Little Rock Central High School.82  Such executive 
boldness, however, was rendered less necessary in the 1960s because the 
political makeup of Congress ensured that many civil rights measures 
could be implemented by statute, rather than by executive order.83  Yet, 
had it not been for executive orders, the struggle for civil rights would 
                                                                                                             
Though the Russell Amendment succeeded in killing FEPC (it was abolished in 1946), 
Presidents have since skirted around the amendment by creating  interdepartmental 
agencies via executive orders and funding them with Executive agency funds, which were 
not within the purview of the Russell Amendment.  Id. at 190. 
81 See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4314 (July 29, 1948) (“It is essential that there be 
maintained in the armed services of the United States the highest standards of democracy, 
with equality of treatment and opportunity for all those who serve in out country’s 
defense”); see also Memorandum from David K. Miles, Administrative Assistant to 
President Harry S. Truman, to James V. Forrestal, Secretary of Defense (May 12, 1948), 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/desegregation/large/doc
uments/index.php?pagenumber=1&documentdate=1948-05-
12&documentid=87&studycollectionid=Desegregation (laying out the methods that the 
Department of Defense should use in implementing Truman’s executive order, in which 
Miles stressed the timeliness and imperative of the order, stating, “I think we are all fully 
aware of the difficulties and the fact that the world is not going to be changed overnight, 
but I also think that the time has come when we must make a start”); DAVID MCCULLOUGH, 
TRUMAN 915 (1992) (arguing, in part because of Executive Order 9981, that Truman had, 
“done more for any President since Lincoln to awaken American conscious to issues of civil 
rights); see also ROSENBURG & ROSENBURG, supra note 6, at 35-37 (noting the broad 
Congressional resistance to civil rights legislation during the Truman era). 
82 See Exec. Order No. 10730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Sept. 25, 1957).  Specifically, the order 
stated: 
I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of Defense to order into the 
active military service of the United States as he may deem appropriate 
to carry out the purposes of this Order, any or all of the units of the 
National Guard of the United States and of the Air National Guard of 
the United States within the State of Arkansas to serve in the active 
military service of the United States for an indefinite period and until 
relieved by appropriate orders. 
Id.  See also, ROSENBURG & ROSENBURG, supra note 6, at 84-86 (describing the President’s role 
in the desegregation of Little Rock High School, arguing that President Eisenhower could 
no longer afford to ignore civil rights in the face of open defiance); Notes by President 
Eisenhower on decision to send troops to Little Rock, Sept. 1957, http://www.eisenhower. 
archives.gov/dl/LittleRock/DDEtroopstoArkansas.pdf (in which President Eisenhower 
doodled to himself, “[t]roops—not to enforce integration but to prevent opposition by 
violence to orders of a court”). 
83 See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.  See also, MILKIS 
& NELSON, supra note 6, at 309-10 (describing the Civil Rights Act—including the fact that 
Congress passed the bill very quickly—and describing the supermajorities won by the 
Democrats in both Houses of Congress in 1964 that allowed Johnson easy passage of his 
Great Society legislation, much of which had to do with civil rights). 
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have been slowed and segregation would have been even more 
pervasive in the middle of the twentieth century.84  
Additionally, although the years following World War II saw the 
maintenance of strong Presidential leadership through executive orders, 
they also brought the most stinging rebuke of Presidential power the 
Court has ever delivered in the form of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v 
Sawyer.85  In Youngstown, President Truman issued an executive order 
authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to take over the nation’s steel 
mills.86  In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court declared that 
                                                 
84 See also PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS, supra note 33, at 91 (describing Executive 
Order 984, issued on December 1, 1908 admitting “deaf mutes to examinations for all 
classified civil service posts for which they are qualified” and predating the Americans 
with Disabilities Act by almost eighty years). 
85 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).  See also MAYER, supra 
note 13, at 74-76.  Mayer argues that although the number of executive orders decreased in 
1953 from an average of 186 per year to an average of 60 per year, they became much less 
trivial and more substantive in nature.  Id. at 76.  The reasons for this shift are threefold.  Id.  
First, routine civil service orders decreased markedly during WWII when FDR began to 
issue blanket orders to deal with individual exemptions.  Id. at 74.  Second, public land 
executive orders decreased during WWII because FDR delegated the authority to manage 
public lands to the Secretary of the Interior.  Id. at 75.  Finally, and most notably, in 1952 
Congress passed the Presidential Sub-delegation Act allowing President Truman to 
formally delegate authority to executive agency actors to issue routine orders.  Id. at 76.  
Accordingly, because Presidents no longer had to deal with the minutiae of civil service 
orders and public land orders, the number of executive orders went down after WWII, 
while the subject matter of orders became increasingly more substantive.  Id.  See also, 
Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., The Presidential Subdelegation Act of 1950, 13 THE JOURNAL OF 
POLITICS 647 (Nov., 1951) (providing a summary of the act as well as an analysis of its 
implications). 
86 See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 81, at 896-97.  McCullough discusses Truman’s rationale 
in seizing the steel mills, referring to the seizure as “one of the boldest, most controversial 
decisions of his presidency.”  Id. at 896.  Following a labor impasse that threatened to shut 
down production, Truman made the decision to seize the mills believing that it was within 
his Presidential power to do so.  Id.  Specifically, McCullough states that years before he 
was appointed to the Supreme Court, Justice Clark had advised Truman that a President 
had “inherent” power to act in order to prevent economic disaster.  Id. at 897.  Further, 
according to later comments by the Secretary of Commerce, days before the seizure 
Truman had received confidential information from Justice Vinson that the President could 
on legal grounds seize the mills.  Id.  Accordingly, McCullough argues, Truman felt that the 
action was constitutional, telling his cautions Secretary of Commerce, “[t]he President has 
the power to keep the country from going to hell.”  Id.  See also, MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN 
AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE:  THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977).  Marcus notes that 
Truman’s decision was most influenced by the Korean War being fought by American 
troops at the time of the seizure.  Id. at 74.  For instance, members of Truman’s cabinet 
argued that (1) all three branches of service relied upon steel in order to effectively fight, (2) 
atomic weapons would not be able to effectively be deployed without steel, (3) ammunition 
supplies were low already, and (4) the stoppage of steel would hurt the Unites States’ 
ability to protect its allies in Europe against Soviet aggression.  Id.  Marcus goes on to assert 
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President Truman lacked the authority to seize the steel industry by 
executive order.87   
The Youngstown decision is significant not just for its rejection of 
expansive Presidential power, but also for the analysis developed in a 
concurring opinion by Justice Jackson, known as the “Jackson test[,]” in 
which he argued that a President’s power is dependent on whether or 
not Congress has spoken to a particular issue.88  Though merely a 
                                                                                                             
that had the defense argument been Truman’s sole basis for the seizure, perhaps the steel 
industry would not have reacted so bitterly; however, his speech announcing the seizure 
served as a scathing rebuke of the greed of big steel.  Id. 
87 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579.  In holding that Truman’s order was unconstitutional, 
the Court in Youngstown stated that, “[t]he President’s power, if any, to issue the order 
must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”  Id. at 585.  The 
court found that Truman had neither Constitutional nor statutory power to issue the order.  
Id. at 585.  Further, the Court emphasized the supremacy of Congress’ legislative authority, 
in good times and in times of national emergency.  Id. at 589.  Accordingly, in a 6-3 
decision, the Court held that Truman’s executive order was unconstitutional.  Id.  See also 
MARCUS, supra note 86 (offering an extensive discussion of the briefs, oral argument, and 
decision in Youngstown).  Significantly, although Congress did not overturn the executive 
order authorizing the steel seizure, they did celebrate its overturn by the Supreme Court.  
See, e.g., C.P. Trussell, Congress Hails End of Steel Seizure, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1952, at A1 
(noting that following the steel seizure, the Senate Judiciary Committee had measures on 
its docket to impeach or censure President Truman, while bills seeking to amend the 
Constitution to ban such seizures were on the Senate Calendar on the day the decision was 
announced). 
88 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634.  In his Youngstown concurrence, Jackson argues that 
the legal consequences of Presidential action are determined by their particular 
circumstances with regard to Congress.  Id. at 635.  Specifically, Jackson argued that: 
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it 
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress 
can delegate.  In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said 
. . . to personify the federal sovereignty.  If his act is held 
unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the 
Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power.  A seizure 
executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be 
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of 
judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest 
heavily upon any who might attack it. 
Id.at 635-37. 
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or 
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent 
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may 
have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.  
Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may 
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures 
on independent Presidential responsibility.  In this area, any actual test 
of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and 
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law. 
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concurring opinion, Justice Jackson’s Youngstown analysis has become 
the decisive judicial test for determining the legality of executive 
orders.89  Furthermore, though it was written in support of an opinion 
that overturned an executive order, in the fifty-five years since it was 
developed, the Jackson Test has been used to uphold numerous orders.90  
In the years immediately following Youngstown, the threat of the 
Cold War ensured that Presidents would continue to issue bold 
executive orders involving national security.91  First, in the area of 
                                                                                                             
Id. at 637. 
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed 
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he 
can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any 
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.  Courts can sustain 
exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the 
Congress from acting upon the subject.  Presidential claim to a power 
at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, 
for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional 
system. 
Id. at 637-38.  Further, Jackson equated each of his classifications to cases that the court had 
heard in the past.  For example, Jackson stated that in Curtiss Wright, President Roosevelt 
had maximum authority to issue his executive order because it was based on a valid 
Congressional grant of authority.  Id. at 636.  Second, Jackson stated that in  Ex parte 
Milligan, President Lincoln was operating within a zone of twilight because there was 
neither a congressional grant nor denial or authority for him to suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus.  Id. at 637.  Finally, Jackson argued that in Myers v U.S., the President acted counter 
to a Congressional statute, thus his power was at its lowest ebb because he relied only 
upon his own Constitutional power in issuing the executive order.  Id. at 638.  Finally, 
Jackson held that because Congress had passed three statutes rejecting giving the authority 
to seize industries, Youngstown fell into the third category, under which the President’s 
authority was at its lowest ebb.  Id. at 640.  Because Jackson found that the President lacked 
the express Constitutional authority on his own to issue the executive order, and he further 
stated that “the President does not enjoy unmentioned powers[,]” he concurred in the 
judgment in finding Truman’s executive order unconstitutional.  Id. 
89 See Dames and Moore v Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (applying the Jackson Test, 
which, “both parties agree brings together as much combination of analysis and common 
sense as there is in this area”); Russell Dean Covey, Note, Adventures in the Zone of Twilight: 
Separation of Powers and National Economic Security in the Mexican Bailout, 105 YALE L.J. 1311, 
1323 (1996) (“In his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson articulated a theory of Presidential 
power that retains force today”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POLICIES 
AND PRINCIPLES 332-34 (2002) (describing the Jackson Test and stating, “[a]nalysis of 
Presidential power often starts with Justice Jackson’s three part test. . . It should be noted 
that the dissenting Justices in Youngstown appeared to agree with this third approach 
[Justice Jackson’s test] to inherent power, but disagreed as to whether Congress had 
acted”). 
90 See, e.g., Dames and Moore, 453 U.S. at 661 (applying the Jackson Test in upholding an 
executive order issued by President Reagan); AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 787 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (same for an executive order issued by President Carter). 
91 See STEVE NEAL, HARRY AND IKE: THE PARTNERSHIP THAT REMADE THE POSTWAR 
WORLD 166-76 (2001) (describing the politically charged atmosphere of the McCarthy era 
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intelligence, Congress and the Court gave Presidents wide latitude in 
intelligence classification and gathering during the 1940s and 1950s.92  
However, during the Communist scares of the 1950s, the Court limited 
the President’s ability to order the administration of loyalty oaths and 
deny security clearance.93  
                                                                                                             
during which both Truman then Eisenhower struggled to fight communism without 
resorting to McCarthy’s tactics). 
92 See, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).  In 
Waterman, the Civil Aeronautics Board, with express approval of the President, issued an 
executive order denying Waterman Steamship a certificate necessary to procure an air 
route and granted one to Chicago and Southern Air Lines, a rival applicant.  Id. at 104.  The 
Court held that the final order qualified as “Presidential discretion” concerning “political 
matters beyond the competence of the courts to adjudicate.”  Id. at 114.  In particular, the 
Court declined to rule on the validity of a Presidential action involving intelligence, stating: 
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ 
for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are 
not and ought not to be published to the world.  It would be 
intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should 
review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on 
information properly held secret.  Nor can courts sit in camera in order 
to be taken into executive confidences.  But even if courts could require 
full disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign 
policy is political, not judicial.  Such decisions are wholly confided by 
our Constitution to the political departments of the government, 
Executive and Legislative.  They are delicate, complex, and involve 
large elements of prophecy.  They are and should be undertaken only 
by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance 
or imperil.  They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has 
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been 
held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial 
intrusion or inquiry. 
Id. at 111. 
93 See Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).  In Cole, the petitioner, a member of the 
classified civil service as a food and drug inspector, was fired because of suspicions that he 
was a communist.  Id. at 540.  Previously, Congress had passed a statute allowing the 
President to terminate the employment of civil servants in a number of agencies if he 
though it was in the best interests of national security.  Id. at 541.  Later, President 
Eisenhower issued an executive order extending the power to all agencies.  Id.  However, 
the Supreme Court declared that this extension was unconstitutional because the Executive 
order had gone beyond Congress’ intention.  Id. at 558.  Instead, the court held that, “an 
employee can be dismissed ‘in the interest of the national security’ under the Act only if he 
occupies a ‘sensitive’ position.” Id. at 551; see also Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 
(1959) (holding that the Department of Defense cannot hold a hearing on the denial of a 
security clearance without traditional due process standards without specific legislative or 
executive authorization to waive due process requirements); Exec. Order No. 10865, 25 Fed. 
Reg. 1583 (February 24, 1960) (establishing a defense security clearance program that 
would comply with the Court’s Due Process requirements); see also MAYER, supra note 13, at 
150 (noting how President Eisenhower issued an executive order complying with the 
Court’s criteria rather than pressing Congress to act, because his advisors felt that “[t]he 
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Next, in the 1970s, following the Court’s unwillingness to curb 
Presidential autonomy in the intelligence arena in the 1950s, Congress 
made two major attempts to restrain Presidential power to issue 
executive orders concerning classification.94  First, in 1971, when 
President Nixon attempted to reinstate the Subversive Activities Control 
Board with the issuance of an executive order, Congress responded by 
expressly overturning the order.95  Next, in 1974, Congress acted to 
ensure that courts could review executive orders concerning 
classification when it revised the Freedom of Information Act.96  
                                                                                                             
appearance of executive impotence would also tend to limit future Presidential discretion 
in this area . . .”). 
94 For a general discussion of the President’s power to issue executive orders dealing 
with foreign affairs and intelligence, see MAYER, supra note 13, at 138-81.  In particular, 
Mayer notes that both intelligence organization and information classification lean heavily 
upon the President’s inherent executive power.  Id. at 139.  Further, Mayer points out that 
although the secrecy of information and intelligence undercuts the ability of both Congress 
and the public to hold Presidents accountable, he has nonetheless been granted wide 
autonomy because of pressing national security concerns.  Id. at 138. 
95 See Exec. Order No. 11605, 36 Fed. Reg. 12831 (July 8, 1971) (amending a previous 
executive order and revising the mission of the Subversive Activities Control Board 
(“SACB”) to identify organizations to which federal employees could not belong).  See also 
MAYER, supra note 13, at 139-41.  Mayer describes President Nixon’s attempt to revitalize 
the SACB and the corresponding Congressional reaction.  Id. at 141.  Specifically, Nixon 
wanted the Board to be charged with the task of reviewing organizations to see which ones 
federal employees could belong to and which ones were subversive.  Id. at 140.  Mayer then 
states that after Nixon issued executive order 11605, Congress reacted swiftly, cutting off 
appropriations and prohibiting the SACB from spending any money pursuant to the order.  
Id.  Notably, this incident marks one of the few instances in which Congress has expressly 
overturned an executive order.  Id. 
96 See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1972).  In Mink, Congresswoman Patsy Mink made a 
request under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) to the President for documents 
concerning underground nuclear testing.  Id. at 74.  The Environmental Protection Agency 
denied the request citing national security concerns.  Id.  The court noted that FOIA 
exempts certain specified categories of information, those required by executive order to be 
kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy.  Id.  Accordingly, the 
Court held that the disclosure of the documents was not required, noting that in camera 
inspection of documents was not made mandatory by the statute and stating, “Congress 
chose to follow the Executive’s determination in these matters and that choice must be 
honored.”  Id. at 81.  But see MAYER, supra note 13, at 156-57.  Mayer notes that following the 
Mink decision Congress amended FOIA to allow the type of in camera judicial review that 
the Court had found lacking in the Mink decision.  Id. at 156.  Notably, the legislation was 
passed over President Ford’s veto.  Id.  See also Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 
(2006). 
(b)  This section does not apply to matters that are— 
(1)  
(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an 
Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national 
defense or foreign policy and 
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However, in practice, judicial review over executive orders has had little 
effect on Presidential actions in the intelligence arena because the Court 
did not interpret Congress’ intent as seeking to restrain Presidential 
power.97  
From there, two decisions issued during the 1970s and 1980s further 
refined the acquiescence doctrine that was first established in Midwest 
Oil in 1915.98  First, in AFL-CIO v. Kahn,99 the D.C. Court of Appeals cited 
the acquiescence doctrine in holding that President Carter could issue 
executive orders advancing broad social policies even if the policies were 
not the reason for the statutory grant of power.100  Then, in Dames & 
Moore v. Regan,101 the Court held that the failure of Congress to reject 
Presidential actions having to do with the Iranian hostage crises 
constituted acquiescence.102  Thus, by the 1980s, courts had not only 
                                                                                                             
(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive 
order 
Id. 
97 See MAYER, supra note 13, at 156-57 (noting that subsequent courts have afforded the 
denial of FOIA requests the utmost deference).  In fact, since the FOIA Amendment, only 
once has an agency been required to turn over classified material.  But see Rosenfeld v. 
Dept. of Justice, 57 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a FOIA request from the 
Department of Justice to obtain information about FBI investigations of 1960s protests at 
the University of California, Berkeley, were, in part, unreasonably denied). 
98 See supra note 57 (providing a discussion of the origins of the acquiescence doctrine in 
U.S. v. Midwest Oil Co.). 
99 AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
100 Id. at 784.  In Kahn, the Court upheld President Carter’s ability to issue an executive 
order denying government contracts to bidders who did not meet certain wage and price 
controls.  Id. at 785.  In particular, the Court noted that as long as there is a close nexus 
between the criteria laid out in a statute and the program implementing the statute via 
executive order, the order is unconstitutional.  Id. at 792.  In the case of Carter’s executive 
order, the statute—the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act—called for 
“economy” and “efficiency.”  Id.  Further, the Court found significant the fact that Congress 
had acquiesced to the practice for a number of years. Specifically, the Court stated: 
The President’s view of his own authority under a statute is not 
controlling, but when that view has been acted upon over a substantial 
period of time without eliciting congressional reversal, it is “entitled to 
great respect.”  As the Supreme Court observed this Term, the 
“construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should 
be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong.” 
Id. at 790.  Accordingly, because President Carter’s executive order had a sufficiently close 
nexus with the authorizing statute, and because Congress had acquiesced to similar orders 
in the past, the order was Constitutional.  Id. at 793. 
101 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
102 Id. at 685.  In Dames & Moore, a company sued the government of Iran and a number 
of Iranian banks.  Id. at 664.  Meanwhile, a series of executive orders issued between 1979 
and 1981 by Presidents Carter and Reagan served to end the Iranian hostage crises by 
nullifying all attachments on Iranian held assets in the U.S. and suspending all claims 
thereto.  Id. at 666.  Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist held that the President had the 
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rejected the non-delegation doctrine in favor of the acquiescence 
doctrine, they had also interpreted the acquiescence doctrine extremely 
broadly, thereby granting the President great power to issue executive 
orders.103 
Following the Court’s broad application of the acquiescence 
doctrine, Congress began to weigh in on the issuance of executive 
orders.104  Since the 1980s, numerous bills have been introduced in 
Congress limiting or altering the President’s ability to issue executive 
orders.105  The most significant of such bills are the Separation of Powers 
Restoration Act106 and the Presidential Order Limitations Act.107  Yet, 
                                                                                                             
right to issue the executive orders and that they served to nullify Dames and Moore’s 
claim.  Id. at 689.  Specifically, the Court cited to Youngstown in holding that, “from the 
history of acquiescence in executive claims settlement—we conclude that the President was 
authorized to suspend pending claims pursuant to Executive Order No. 12294.”  Id. at 686.  
Accordingly, the Court concluded, “[t]he President has exercised the power, acquiesced in 
by Congress, to settle claims and, as such, has simply effected a change in the substantive 
law governing the lawsuit.”  Id. at 685.  See also COOPER, supra note 14, at 10 (noting that 
Rehnquist had been a law clerk for Justice Jackson, the author of the Youngstown 
concurrence, and went on to write the Dames and Moore opinion which served to expand 
the Youngstown test by finding that the failure of Congress “to reject the actions of the two 
Presidents, coupled with what were considered to be similar examples of international 
settlement agreements, constituted acquiescence in the President’s actions”). 
103 See Kahn, 618 F.2d at 790 (holding that the President’s interpretation of his own 
authority is “entitled to great respect” in the absence of Congressional action to the 
contrary); Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 685 (holding that “[t]he President has exercised . . . 
power, acquiesced in by Congress”). 
104 See infra notes 106-07. 
105 See, e.g., H.R. 27, 107th Cong. (2001) (granting members of Congress and aggrieved 
members of the public standing to challenge Executive Orders deploying U.S. troops into 
hostilities or using Department of Defense monies to do so); H.R. 3838, 101st Cong. §6 
(1989) (granting the President the power to issue Executive Orders altering the scope of 
orders issued by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board). 
106 See H.R. 2655, 106th Cong. (1999); HR 864, 107th Cong. (2001).  Though introduced in 
two separate Congresses with over forty sponsors, the Separation of Powers Restoration 
Act languished in committee.  Id.  The text of the statute reads in pertinent part: 
SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT OF STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY FOR 
PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS. 
 (a) STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY-The President shall include with 
each Presidential order a statement of the specific statutory or 
constitutional provision which in fact grants the President the 
authority claimed for such action. 
(b) INVALIDITY OF NONCONFORMING ORDERS-A Presidential 
order which does not include the statement required by subsection (a) 
is invalid, to the extent such Presidential order is issued under 
authority granted by a congressional enactment. 
 
SEC. 5. EFFECT OF PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS. 
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(a) LIMITED EFFECT OF PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS-A Presidential 
order neither constitutes nor has the force of law and is limited in its 
application and effect to the executive branch. 
 (b) EXCEPTIONS-Subsection (a) does not apply to— 
(1) a reprieve or pardon for an offense against the United 
States, except in cases of impeachment; 
(2) an order given to military personnel pursuant to duties 
specifically related to actions taken as Commander in Chief 
of the Armed Forces; 
(3) a Presidential order citing the specific congressional 
enactment relied upon for the authority exercised in such 
order and— 
(A) issued pursuant to such authority; 
(B) commensurate with the limit imposed by the 
plain language of such authority; 
(C) not issued pursuant to a ratified or unratified 
treaty or bilateral or  multilateral agreement 
. . . 
 
SEC. 6. STANDING TO CHALLENGE PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS 
WHICH IMPACT SEPARATION OF POWERS INTEGRITY. 
The following persons may bring an action in an appropriate United 
States court to challenge the validity of any Presidential order which 
exceeds the power granted to the President by the relevant authorizing 
statute or the Constitution: 
(1) CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS-The House of Representatives, 
the Senate, any Senator, and any Representative to the House of 
Representatives, if the challenged Presidential order— 
(A) infringes on any power of Congress; 
(B) exceeds any power granted by a congressional 
enactment; or 
(C) violates section 4 because it does not state the statutory 
authority which in fact grants the President the power 
claimed for the action taken in such Presidential order. 
(2) STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS-The highest governmental 
official of any State, commonwealth, district, territory, or possession of 
the United States, or any political subdivision thereof, or the designee 
of such person, if the challenged Presidential order infringes on the 
powers afforded to the States under the Constitution. 
(3) AGGRIEVED PERSONS-Any person aggrieved in a liberty or 
property interest adversely affected directly by the challenged 
Presidential order. 
107 See H.R. 3131, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 23, 107th Cong. (2001).  The Presidential Order 
Limitations Act has been introduced in the United States House of Representatives twice, 
most recently in 2001.  Id.  Yet, the Act has not had wide support and has never made it out 
of committee.  Id.  The text of the act reads as follows: 
(a) TRANSMISSION OF PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS TO CONGRESS- 
The President shall transmit a copy of each Presidential order to- 
(1) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; 
(2) the President pro tempore of the Senate; and 
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neither of these bills passed and Congress has yet to pass a statute 
limiting a President’s ability to issue an executive order, indicating a lack 
of political will to restrict the President’s power.108  
In contrast to the Congressional inaction in the wake of the Court’s 
broad interpretation of the acquiescence doctrine, lower courts have 
invalidated two executive orders involving labor policy for going 
beyond granted legislative authority.109  First, in Chamber of Commerce v. 
Reich,110 the D.C. Court of Appeals held that President Clinton lacked the 
statutory authority to issue an executive order which conflicted with an 
already existing statute.111  Similarly, in 2001, in Building and Construction 
                                                                                                             
(3) the chairperson and ranking member of each standing 
and select committee of the House of Representatives and 
the Senate. 
(b) TIME BEFORE TAKING EFFECT- Except as provided in subsection 
(c), to the extent a Presidential order is issued under authority granted 
by any enactment of the Congress, such order shall not take effect 
earlier than 30 days after its transmission pursuant to subsection (a), 
during which time the Congress may review and take any action it 
deems appropriate with regard to such order (or portion thereof). 
(c) EXCEPTION FOR EMERGENCIES- The time limitation in 
subsection (b) shall not apply in the case of a Presidential order 
describing an emergency which requires the order to take effect at an 
earlier time to 
(1) protect the national security; 
(2) prevent physical injury to any individual; 
(3) provide disaster relief; or 
(4) safeguard an American foreign policy interest. 
108 See supra note 106 (noting that the Separation of Powers Restoration Act was not 
passed despite significant support and a committee hearing held on the bill); supra note 107 
(noting that the Presidential Order Limitations Act died in committee with little 
Congressional support). 
109 See Branum, supra note 24, at 11 (providing a summary of Reich and Allbaugh and 
contrasting the two cases). 
110 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Reich, 316 U.S. App. D.C. 61 (D.C. Cir. 
1996). 
111 Id. at 1324.  In Reich, the court declared unconstitutional an executive order issued by 
President Clinton.  Id.  Specifically, the order stated: “It is the policy of the executive branch 
in procuring goods and services that, to ensure the economical and efficient administration 
and completion of Federal Government contracts, contracting agencies shall not contract 
with employers that permanently replace lawfully striking employees.”  Id.  The plaintiff 
challenged the order, claiming it contradicted the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).  
Id. at 1325.  Further, the plaintiffs claimed that the President was required to issue findings 
of fact in the order, otherwise the executive order would be an unconstitutional delegation 
of legislative power under Panama Refining Co.  Id.  The Court agreed, holding that the 
order conflicted with the NLRA, and accordingly the executive order was declared invalid.  
Id. at 1338.  See also MAYER, supra note 13, at 49 (discussing the Court’s rationale in Reich 
and arguing that the decision was not a significant departure from the Court’s typical 
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Trades Department v. Allbaugh,112 a district court enjoined an executive 
order issued by President Bush partly on pre-emption grounds and 
partly on Constitutional grounds.113  However, in a telling reversal, the 
D.C. Court of Appeals held that the President, in fact, had the authority 
to issue the executive order.114 
The Allbaugh case is merely the latest addition to a Constitutional 
dialogue that has been going on since the age of Washington.115  As two 
hundred years of this dialogue prove, determining whether or not 
executive orders are legal is a question that goes to the very heart of our 
system of government.116  Accordingly, the next section will analyze 
whether executive orders vest too much power in the President, the 
extent of congressional oversight of executive orders, and the efficacy of 
the Court’s jurisprudence in the area of executive orders.117    
III.  ANALYSIS 
As the previous Part demonstrates, American history is replete with 
executive orders, ranging from the mundane to the controversial.118  
Correspondingly, judicial decisions over the past two centuries have 
served to expand, or at times limit, Presidential power to issue such 
                                                                                                             
deference because the Court simply invalidated an order that directly conflicted with a 
statute, rather than lessening the acquiescence doctrine). 
112 Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t v. Allbaugh, 172 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.D.C. 2001). 
113 Id. at 138 (holding that President Bush’s executive order that disallowed federal 
agencies requiring or prohibiting project labor agreements was unconstitutional, because 
the President had no statutory authority to issue the order). 
114 Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  In Allbaugh, 
the D.C. circuit reversed, holding that the order did not conflict with the NLRA and that 
the President had the authority to issue the order.  Id. at 36.  Specifically, the court noted: 
“The President’s power necessarily encompasses ‘general administrative control of those 
executing the laws,’ throughout the Executive Branch of government, of which he is the 
head.”  Id. at 32 (Citation Omitted). 
115 See supra note 14 (referring to jurisprudence in the area of executive orders as a 
“constitutional dialogue”). 
116 See MAYER, supra note 13, at 218 (quoting Justice Storey stating “problems among the 
most important and probably the most difficult to be satisfactorily resolved, of all which 
are involved in the theory of free governments”). 
117 See infra Part III. 
118 See also MAYER, supra note 13, at 75 (describing the mundane business of early 
executive orders, which mostly served to establish Indian Reservations and townships, and 
set aside land for the military); COOPER, supra note 14, at 8 (listing significant executive 
orders, including: the order interring Japanese-Americans during WWII, the order 
desegregating the military in 1948, and the order blocking striker replacements during the 
1990s). 
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orders.119  This Part will seek to answer some pressing questions 
concerning executive orders stemming from all three branches of the 
federal government.120  First, this Part will analyze whether executive 
orders are necessary parts of Presidential lawmaking.121  Second, this 
Part will analyze the efficacy of judicial determinations in the area of 
executive orders.122  Finally, this Part will assess Congressional oversight 
over the issuance of executive orders.123  
A. Executive Orders and the Executive Branch:  Instruments of Presidential 
Tyranny or Executive Boldness? 
President Clinton’s advisor, Paul Begala, once famously summed up 
the administration’s opinion about executive orders:  “Stroke of the pen 
. . . Law of the land.  Kind of cool.”124  Yet, for all of their convenience 
and prevalence, it remains unclear whether executive orders are 
necessary and exactly how our national landscape would be different 
without them.  Many argue that the ease with which a President can 
issue an order causes them to be per se abusive.125  Yet, in order to 
                                                 
119 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) 
(establishing the non-delegation doctrine, stating that Congress cannot delegate its 
legislative power to the President); U.S. v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) (outlining 
the acquiescence doctrine, whereby Congress can acquiesce to a President’s executive order 
by failing to legislate against it); Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (1804) (establishing the 
supremacy of statutes over executive orders). 
120 See infra Parts III.A-C. 
121 See infra Part III.A. 
122 See infra part III.B. 
123 See infra part III.C. 
124 James Bennet, True to Form, Clinton Shifts Energies Back to U.S. Focus, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 
1998 at A10. 
125 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 25, at 589.  Anderson argues that executive orders are 
legislative in nature and upset the balance of powers by vesting legislative power in the 
executive branch.  Id. at 611.  Accordingly, Anderson concludes that executive orders run 
the risk of becoming what the Federalist papers termed “[t]he [v]ery [d]efinition of 
[t]yranny.”  Id. at 589.  See also Branum, supra note 24, at 1.  Branum argues that simply 
because a person agrees with a particular President, that is no reason to allow all Presidents 
the power to unilaterally write a policy into law.  Id. at 2.  Branum blames not only the 
public, but also Congress and various Presidents for allowing the spike in executive orders.  
Id. at 22.  Specifically, she argues that the public has simply become used to Presidential 
abuse of the power to issue executive orders, vehemently stating, “[o]nce President Clinton 
illegitimately snatched the authority to decide this issue from the legislature, few even 
bothered to wonder whether President Bush actually had the responsibility (or authority) 
to take over the decision-making on this issue.”  Id. at 46.  See also Gaziano, supra note 23, at 
287.  Gaziano argues that legal rules surrounding executive orders have resulted in many 
improper orders becoming law.  Id.  Specifically, Gaziano argues that, through his use of 
executive orders, “President Clinton abused his authority . . .”  Id. at 272.  Yet, despite the 
fact that Anderson, Branum, and Gaziano all argue against executive orders, stating that 
they are per se abusive and tyrannical, they fail to look beyond partisan politics of the day 
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genuinely assess the efficacy of executive orders, it is necessary to look at 
both the best and worst of Presidential orders. 
Perhaps the most notorious executive order ever issued, Executive 
Order 9066, authorized the internment of Japanese-Americans during 
World War II.126  Yet, the government’s subsequent support for the 
order, including Congressional passage of a statute affirming the order 
and the Supreme Court’s firm support of the internment, is illustrative.  
For even without the executive order, the internment still would have 
taken place:  Congress simply would have passed a statute facilitating 
the internment and the Court would have affirmed the statute just as it 
affirmed the executive order.127  If Congress had been against the 
internment, they could have easily overturned the order by statute.128   
The middle ground, wherein an executive order is passed and 
Congress neither overturns the order nor affirms it by statute, constitutes 
the only situation in which executive abuse has occurred because of an 
executive order; however, at this point the burden must shift to Congress 
to reign in the President.129  Congress’s failure to overturn an abusive 
executive order indicates Congressional irresponsibility, confounding 
the idea of checks and balances and evidencing corruption at the highest 
levels.  Thus, the practice of issuing executive orders is not per se flawed 
simply because an order has the potential for abuse, because:  (1) like the 
Japanese internment, the order would have been passed and brought 
                                                                                                             
toward what the historical ramifications would be if executive orders did not have the 
position they currently possess in American politics. 
126 See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942) (arguing that “successful 
prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against 
sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense 
utilities”). 
127 See supra note 75 and accompanying text; see also, 56 Stat. 173 (1942) (Congressional 
statute outlining the penalty for violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons 
entering, remaining in, leaving, or committing any act in military areas or zones); 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding the order and arguing, 
“[c]ompulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes . . . is inconsistent 
with our basic governmental institutions.  But when under conditions of modern warfare 
our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate 
with the threatened danger”). 
128 See Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (1804) (establishing the supremacy of statutes over 
executive orders); see also supra note 95 (describing the process of Congress overriding 
President Nixon’s executive order by passing a statute). 
129 See infra note 158 (comparing Congressional acquiescence to an executive order to 
statutory lawmaking in which the President allows a bill to become law but refuses to sign 
it). 
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into existence even in the absence of unilateral executive power; or (2) 
the order can and should be superceded by Congress.130 
On the other hand, one of the most progressive and acclaimed 
executive orders, Executive Order 9981, desegregated the United States 
military in 1948.131  Unlike the order interning the Japanese-Americans, 
Truman’s executive order was not affirmed by Congress.132  Thus, Order 
9981, like so many civil rights orders before and after, is significant 
because “but for” the executive order, there is little chance that the 
United States military would have been desegregated by 1953.133  Thus, 
Executive Order 9981 highlights a larger issue having to do with 
executive orders:  by issuing a controversial executive order, the 
President takes the political heat and historical glory for issuing an order 
that Congress, for ideological and political reasons, is unwilling or 
unable to pass as a statute.134 
                                                 
130 This analysis is similar to the “but for” test that is at the heart of factual causation in 
tort law.  For a description of the “but for” test, see VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, 
STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 364-65 (3rd ed. 2005).  Johnson and Gunn explain the “but 
for” test, which asks, but for the defendant’s conduct, would the harm have occurred?  Id. 
at 364.  If the answer is yes, than the defendant is a cause in fact of the harm. Id.  If not, the 
defendant is not a factual cause of defendant’s harm.  Id.  Further Johnson and Gunn state 
that the “but for” test is normally required for a defendant to be liable in tort law.  Id. at 
365. 
131 See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4131 (July 29, 1948) (stating that, “it is essential 
that there be maintained in the armed services of the United States the highest standards of 
democracy, with equality of treatment and opportunity for all who serve in our country’s 
defense”). 
132 See, e.g., ROSENBURG & ROSENBURG, supra note 6, at 36 (noting that Civil Rights bills 
stalled in the late 1940s, because the “conservative coalition in Congress bottled up 
legislation”); see also MAYER, supra note 13, at 186 (“By the 1930s . . . legislative hostility to 
significant civil rights legislation was firmly entrenched, largely a function of southern 
opposition to federal intervention of any kind.”). 
133 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 130, at 364-65 (3d ed. 2005) (describing the “but for” 
test as it applies to tort law). 
134 See Martin Luther King, Jr., The President Has the Power: Equality Now, THE NATION, 91-
95 (Feb. 4, 1961).  In this 1961 article, Dr. King states, “[i]t is no exaggeration to say that the 
President could give segregation its death blow through a stroke of the pen.”  Id. at 93.  In 
attempting to persuade the incoming Kennedy Administration to act in the area of civil 
rights, Dr. King cited the inadequate measures the government had taken to advance civil 
rights prior to the 1960s.  Id. at 92.  As a remedy, Dr. King first suggested that the President 
pressure Congress for action, stating, “[t]he influence the President can exert upon 
Congress when, with crusading zeal, he summons support from the nation has been 
demonstrated more than once in the past.”  Id.  But beyond influencing the legislature, Dr. 
King argued for the bold use of executive orders in advancing civil rights, including orders 
to: (1) end discrimination in housing, (2) prohibit government contractors from 
discriminating, (3) end employment discrimination in executive agencies, and (4) end 
segregation in public hospitals.  Id.  Dr. King’s strong emphasis on executive orders 
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Thus, executive orders may appear tyrannical based on the broad 
power they afford Presidents; however, in effect, they are useful tools of 
the Presidency, able to be checked by Congressional oversight.135  
Without executive orders, bad policy would still find its way into the law 
books because all three branches of government are fallible.136  But with 
executive orders, Presidents are sometimes able to make bold, far-
sighted policy, even when Congress is unwilling to act.137   
B. Executive Orders and the Legislative Branch:  Assessing Congress’ Check 
on Presidential Power  
As Justice Brandeis stated, “[t]he separation of the powers of 
government did not make each branch completely autonomous. It left 
each, in some measure, dependent upon the others.”138  Indeed, in the 
area of executive orders, the President’s ability to issue an order is 
                                                                                                             
indicates that he found this to be the most likely area for government action.  In other 
words, it was through executive orders and not Congressional legislation that Dr. King 
thought civil rights would progress.  See also, MCCULLOUGH, supra note 81, at 915.  
McCullough offers an example of the extent to which Truman’s order effected his legacy.  
Specifically, McCullough emphasized the positive effect Executive Order 9981 has had on 
Truman’s legacy by arguing that Truman had “done more for any President since Lincoln 
to awaken American conscious to issues of civil rights.”  Id. 
135 See infra Part III.B (describing Congressional oversight of executive orders). 
136 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison).  In Federalist No. 37, James Madison 
discusses the inherent fallibility of government and, in particular, the new government 
submitted by the members of the Constitutional Convention.  Id. 
Persons . . . will proceed to an examination of the plan submitted by 
the Convention, not only without a disposition to find or to magnify 
faults; but will see the propriety of reflecting that a faultless plan was 
not to be expected.  Nor will they barely make allowances for the 
errors which may be chargeable on the fallibility to which the 
Convention, as a body of men, were liable; but will keep in mind, that 
they themselves also are but men, and ought not to assume an 
infallibility in rejudging the fallible opinions of others. 
Id. 
137 See COOPER, supra note 14, at 70.  Cooper notes that executive orders are one way for a 
President to take significant actions without attracting much attention.  Id.  Cooper calls 
this “hiding in plain sight,” and states: 
Few people regard executive orders as important, which has made 
them a vehicle that can be used to take significant actions that are . . . 
unlikely in most instances, to attract much attention, unless they are 
particularly sweeping in character. 
Id.  Cooper’s assessment is correct.  Moreover, if, as Cooper postulates, an order is 
sweeping in character or particularly abusive, someone will pay attention and Congress 
can then, if necessary, exercise the appropriate oversight in restraining Presidential action. 
138 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 291 (1926). 
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largely dependent upon the action or inaction of Congress.139  Yet, 
traditionally Congress has been reluctant to exercise either option, and 
its reluctance is entirely political.  
For instance, since the Court’s 1804 holding in Little v. Baremme, it 
has been well established that a statute supersedes an executive order.140  
Yet, Congress has only overridden an executive order a few times over 
the past one hundred years.141  One reason for this may simply be a 
matter of Congress’ inability to gather the necessary votes to override a 
President’s veto of the superseding statute.142  For example, members of 
a President’s political party may be unwilling to overturn a measure 
promulgated by their party’s leader.143  Still, Congressional practice over 
the past century indicates that if a President were to issue a particularly 
egregious executive order, Congress would overturn the order by 
statute.144  
Additionally, Congress has the power to broadly limit the 
President’s ability to issue executive orders, yet no such statute has come 
                                                 
139 See supra note 88 (presenting the Jackson test, in which a President’s executive order is 
given disparate amounts of deference depending on whether Congress has expressly 
authorized an order, has remained silent as to an issue, or has passed legislation counter to 
an order). 
140 See supra notes 29-31 (describing Little v. Baremme, in which the court explicitly held 
that statutes can override executive orders). 
141 See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 13, at 139-41 (describing Nixon’s effort to revive the 
Subversive Activities Control Board and Congress’s response of passing a statute in order 
to override the order). 
142 See BARBOUR & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 280 (“Because the President can usually count 
on the support of at least one-third of one of the houses, the veto is a powerful negative tool; 
it is hard for Congress to accomplish legislative goals that are opposed by the President.”). 
143 For a discussion of the President’s influence in Congressional legislating, see 
BURDETTE A. LOOMIS, THE CONTEMPORARY CONGRESS 155 (2000).  Loomis argues that the 
President exercises unparalleled influence over the behavior of Senators and 
Representatives, stating: 
As a rule no member of Congress is as important a legislator as is the 
chief executive. . . . Whether in setting the congressional agenda, 
twisting a lawmaker’s arm to support a favored measure, or 
threatening to veto an unsatisfactory bill, the President can affect the 
legislative process more forcefully, and in more ways, than the most 
influential senator or representative. 
Id. 
144 See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 13, at 27-28.  Mayer explains that Congress has successfully 
blocked two executive orders since 1970.  Id. at 27.  First, in 1972, Congress blocked 
President Nixon’s efforts to reestablish the Subversive Activities Control Board.  Id. at 28.  
Second, in 1998, Congress blocked President Clinton from spending money on funds to 
carry out an executive order on federalism.  Id.  However, Mayer goes on to state that 
Congress has, since 1973, mounted twenty-six efforts to block executive orders.  Id. 
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close to passing.  Both the Separation of Power Restoration Act and 
Presidential Orders Limitation Act, which were introduced into 
Congress over the past few years, would have sharply increased 
Congressional oversight in the area of executive orders, yet this 
oversight may be precisely the reasons why those measures failed.145  
More succinctly, though Congress may want to check Presidential 
power, it may not want the added responsibility, and correspondingly, 
the potential political liability that would come with increased 
oversight.146   
Another reason why Congress has been unwilling to curb the power 
to issue executive orders is that when Congress or the public see an 
executive order as abusive, members of Congress are often preoccupied 
with placing political blame, and thus, Congress does not address the 
larger issue of whether a President ought to have the power to issue such 
orders in the first place.147  For example, at the height of the Teapot 
Dome scandal of the 1920s, neither the new President nor Congress nor 
the media framed the scandal in terms of its origins in an executive 
order.148  Instead, all talk focused on where the political blame should 
fall.149  Conversely, in Youngstown, the fact that the steel seizure was 
                                                 
145 See supra note 106 (describing the Separation of Power Restoration Act, which would 
have allowed Senator and Members of Congress standing to challenge any executive order 
they allege to be illegal).  See also supra note 107 (describing the Presidential Orders 
Limitation Act, which would have created a thirty day lapse after an order is written but 
before it has taken effect, during which time the Act would have granted Congress the 
power to review and take any action it deems appropriate). 
146 See BARBOUR & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 748.  Barbour and Wright describe Congress’ 
unwillingness to enforce the War Powers Resolution of 1973.  Id.  In particular, Barbour and 
Wright state that while the President routinely circumvents Congress in making foreign 
policy, Congress does not view this circumvention as a bad thing: “The calculation for 
Congress is fairly straightforward: let the President pursue risky military strategies. If he 
succeeds, take credit for staying out of his way; if he fails, blame him not consulting and for 
being, ‘imperial.’  Either way, Congress wins.”  Id.  This analysis may go far in explaining 
why Congress is so willing to allow the President latitude in issuing executive orders—
Congress can allow the President to make policies for which Congress cannot be held 
politically liable. 
147 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
148 For a description of the Teapot Dome scandal, see supra note 60 and accompanying 
text.  See also, The President, supra note 61, at A1 (offering an example of how the President’s 
reaction to the Teapot Dome scandal ignored the fact that Teapot Dome began with an 
executive order issued by his predecessor); Republican Organ, supra note 61, at A1 (same 
with regard to Congressional Republicans’ reaction to the scandal); Warm Controversy, supra 
note 61, at A1 (same with regard to Congressional Democrats’ reaction to the scandal). 
149 For an example of the type of partisan rancor that prevents Congress from looking at 
the overriding issue of the validity of executive orders, see Warm Controversy, supra note 61, 
at A1.  This article, published the day after it was revealed that an oil official had 
transferred one hundred thousand dollars to the Secretary of the Interior based on an 
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caused by an executive order was at the forefront of the debate over 
Presidential abuse.150  Therefore, when Presidential action is seen as 
abusive because of an executive order, Congress is more likely to 
respond by curbing Presidential power.151  However, when Presidential 
action is seen as abusive without specific focus on the involvement of an 
executive order, Congress most likely will not act and the power to issue 
executive orders will go unchecked.152  
C. Executive Orders and the Judicial Branch:  Is the Jackson Test up to the 
Task?  
During the New Deal, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
compared the three branches of government to three horses working 
together to plow a field, with the failure of one resulting in the failure of 
all three.153  In the field of executive orders, the Court has been a fairly 
cooperative horse, affirming independent executive action, issuing the 
acquiescence doctrine, and granting the President broad deference in the 
                                                                                                             
executive order issued by the late President Harding offers Congressional reaction to the 
Teapot Dome Scandal.  Id.  Specifically, Democratic leaders in Congress were concerned 
that President Coolidge had purposefully preempted a statement by a Democratic Senator 
calling for an independent investigation of the scandal by calling for one of his own.  Id.  
Further, Democratic leaders in Congress asserted that their Republican counterparts 
purposefully stalled their announcement to allow the President to gain from making the 
announcement of the investigation, first stating that, “(Republican) Leaders were greatly 
worried yesterday after it was seen that [Democratic] action . . . would place the 
Republicans in the attitude of being forced to “clean house.”  Id.  It follows that if the 
President and members of Congress from both political parties of Congress were worried 
only about the political fallout from the Teapot Dome Scandal, there was little concern as to 
whether or not executive orders such as the type that led to the scandal ought to be issued 
in the first place. 
150 See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 81, at 896 (calling the order “one of the boldest, most 
controversial decisions of his presidency”). 
151 See Trussell, supra note 87, at A1 (noting that following the steel seizure, “[a] House 
Judiciary subcommittee . . . has on its docket a dozen or so measures to impeach Mr. 
Truman, to censure him or to give him powers or deprive him of them”). 
152 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
153 See Another Crises, TIME, (Mar. 15, 1932). 
As yet there is no definite assurance that the three-horse team of the 
American system of government will pull together.  If three well-
matched horses are put to the task of plowing up a field where the 
going is heavy, and the team of three pull as one, the field will be 
plowed. If one horse lies down in the traces or plunges off in another 
direction, the field will not be plowed. 
Id. 
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area of national security orders.154  But does the Court’s cooperation lend 
itself too readily to affirming tyrannical executive orders?    
Paradoxically, Youngstown, the most dramatic instance of the Court 
declining to cooperate with the executive branch, also presented the 
seminal test that the Court has used to uphold subsequent executive 
orders.155  Justice Jackson’s test, outlined in Youngstown, which grants the 
President less deference depending upon Congressional action or 
inaction, properly assures that executive orders will not become 
instruments of abuse.156  By allowing Congressional behavior to 
determine whether an executive order is valid, the Courts have allowed 
the two political branches of government to draw the territorial line 
themselves.157  Congress is able to allow the President to issue an 
executive order without endorsing it or overturning it.158  This process 
                                                 
154 See, e.g., In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890) (affirming independent Presidential action to 
enforce the law); U.S. v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 471 (1915) (outlining the 
acquiescence doctrine, stating, “Congress did not repudiate the power claimed or the 
withdrawal orders made”).  But see, Rosenfeld v. Dep’t of Justice, 57 F.3d 803 (1995) 
(serving as one of the few times in which the Court has stated that an executive agency 
violated the Freedom of Information Act). 
155 See supra note 88 and accompanying text (describing the Youngstown decision, 
containing Justice Jackson’s test for the validity of independent executive action). 
156 See supra note 88 and accompanying test (describing the Youngstown analysis whereby, 
(1) a President’s authority is at its maximum when he is acting pursuant to an express 
statutory grant of authority, (2) a President’s power is in a “zone of twilight” when he acts 
pursuant to neither a congressional grant of authority nor a denial of authority, and (3) a 
President’s power is at its lowest ebb when he takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress). 
157 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).  Dames & Moore held that the 
failure of Congress to reject the actions of the President, coupled with similar examples of 
international settlement agreements that had been affirmed by Congress, were sufficient to 
constitute acquiescence.  Id.  This put the President’s actions in the first category of the 
Jackson test, in which a President’s power is at its strongest.  Id.  Not surprisingly, once 
categorized thusly, the action was upheld.  Id.  Dames & Moore illustrates that the Court has 
left the line drawing to Congress and the President by assessing specific Congressional 
actions that indicated their support or disapproval of the action rather than relying upon 
an a Court test to figure out whether or not the subject of the executive order was within 
the purview of Congress. 
158 See BARBOUR & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 280.  This silent, but significant acquiescence 
to an executive order is not without its precedent.  In fact, the reciprocal is present in the 
case of statutory lawmaking.  Id.  For example, when the President wants to allow 
something to become law without drawing too much attention to it, he may simply do 
nothing.  Id.  As long as Congress remains in session, the bill will automatically become law 
within ten days, even without a Presidential signature.  Id.  As Barbour and Wright put it, 
“[t]his seldom used option signals Presidential dislike for a bill, but not enough dislike for 
him to veto it.”  Id.  Similarly, Congress may either dislike an executive order, and thus 
would not pass it into law, or they might like it just fine, but simply do not want to extend 
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results in a delicate political balance between Congress and the 
President, and allows the Court to stay out of subjective determinations 
of whether or not a President has issued a tyrannical executive order.159    
Though Youngstown properly ensures that executive orders do not 
become mechanisms of executive tyranny, there is one area in which the 
Court has inexplicably declined to apply the Youngstown analysis—
intelligence and government classification.160  Even following clear 
Congressional attempts to curb the President’s power to classify 
information under the Freedom of Information Act and allow Courts to 
review intelligence information in camera, the Court has declined to 
apply the proper prong of the Jackson Test.161  Instead, the Court has 
treated intelligence and classification orders as if they are backed by 
Constitutional or statutory authority, when they are in fact within the 
purview of both the executive and legislative branches of government.162  
Thus, the Court offered deference to the President for policy reasons.163  
Yet, avoidance of these types of subjective judicial determinations was 
the reason behind the Jackson test.  Accordingly, under the Jackson test, 
Congress, and not the Court, should be making the determination of 
how much deference to give to the President in issuing intelligence 
orders.164  
As this Part has shown, though executive orders may seem to leave 
open the possibility of Presidential abuse, in practice, the system, though 
not perfect, creates appropriate blocks to executive tyranny.165  First, 
executive orders allow the President to issue bold prerogatives on 
                                                                                                             
the political capital, or do not possess the political capital, to pass an order into law.  
Therefore, Congress can simply do nothing and acquiesce to the order’s validity. 
159 See infra Part III.A, Part III.B. 
160 See, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) 
(“It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and 
perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret.”). 
161 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (providing examples of Congress’ 
attempt to reign in Presidential autonomy in classification and intelligence orders). 
162 See, e.g., Waterman, 333 U.S. at 111 (“Such decisions are wholly confided by our 
Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They 
are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.”) (emphasis added).  But see 
MAYER, supra note 13, at 156-57 (noting that even after congressional attempts to allow for 
greater judicial review of classified information, courts have afforded the denial of FOIA 
requests the utmost deference). 
163 See, e.g., Waterman, 333 U.S. at 111 (“The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and 
as the Nation’s organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports 
are not and ought not to be published to the world”). 
164 See supra note 88 (describing the Jackson test). 
165 See supra Part III. 
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politically sensitive issues.166  Second, Congress is able to appropriately 
check any potential for Presidential abuse, though it does not often do 
so.167  Finally, the Court’s test for the validity of executive orders is 
proper, though it is improperly applied to intelligence and 
classification.168  In short, the Constitutional dialogue on executive orders 
has been a productive one, producing a test that, if applied correctly, can 
guard against executive tyranny and abuse.  However, Congressional 
oversight has not been sufficiently effective and the Court’s application 
of the Jackson test is flawed in the area of intelligence and 
classification.169  Now, it is up to Congress to take a bolder stance on 
such issues in order for the Court to apply the test correctly.170 
IV.  PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTION  
As the previous Part illustrates, each of the three branches of the 
Federal Government plays an important role in ensuring that executive 
orders do not become tools of tyranny.171  Even when the President 
issues an order that has the potential for abuse, one of the other two 
branches of the federal government has the power to nullify the order, 
either through the passage of a Congressional statute or by the issuance 
of a judicial decision.172  Generally this system of checks and balances 
ensures that the executive order remains a benign measure for Presidents 
to efficiently administer the executive branch. 
However, in order for executive orders to remain effective vehicles 
for Presidential power, the other two branches of the federal 
government—Congress in particular—must be proactive in restraining 
executive power when it becomes abusive.  This Part presents three ways 
in which Congress can be the first and most powerful bulwark against 
Presidential tyranny via executive order.  First, Congress must be 
unequivocal in its support or disdain for particular types of executive 
orders.173  Second, Congress must ensure that the public is informed 
about the topic of various executive orders as well as the fact that they 
have the force and effect of law.174  Finally, Congress must ensure that 
                                                 
166 See supra Part III.A. 
167 See supra Part III.B. 
168 See supra Part III.C. 
169 See supra Part III.C. 
170 See infra Part IV. 
171 See supra Part III. 
172 See supra note 27 (describing Little v. Baremme, a Supreme Court case that overturned 
an executive order and established statutory supremacy over executive orders). 
173 See infra Part IV.A. 
174 See infra Part IV.B. 
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when an abusive executive order is issued, Senators and Representatives 
frame the Congressional and public debates in terms of the order itself 
and not the President who issued it.175   
A. Clarifying Intentions:  Congress Must Explicitly State Its Desire to 
Restrain the President’s Ability to Issue Executive Orders 
In instances where a President issues an executive order that is 
harmful or tyrannical, and Congress acts to alleviate the risk of 
corruption, it then falls to the court system to apply the Jackson Test 
from Youngstown in order to determine whether or not the President has 
the independent power to issue the executive order.176  Only when the 
Court finds that the President has independent power to issue the order 
under the third prong of the Jackson Test is the order proper.  Further, 
because the President’s power is at its lowest ebb under the third prong 
of the Jackson Test, the likelihood of the Court upholding such an order 
is minimal.177   
However, in order for the Jackson Test to work, Congress must first 
be clear about its intentions toward a particular type of executive order.  
For example, one category in which Congress has unsuccessfully sought 
to remove unilateral power from the executive branch has been in the 
area of Presidential classification via executive order.178  Following the 
Watergate scandal, Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”) in order to limit the President’s ability to classify certain 
documents.179  However, the Court has subsequently interpreted the 
President’s power expansively and has only once ordered classified 
documents released due to legislative history, suggesting that the 
President’s determination ought to be given significant weight.180  The 
lesson from the FOIA example is that if Congress wishes to decrease the 
President’s autonomy in issuing executive orders, this must be made 
                                                 
175 See infra Part IV.C. 
176 See supra note 88 and accompanying text (describing Justice Jackson’s concurrence in 
Youngstown, which stands as the proper judicial test for the validity of an executive order). 
177 See supra note 88 and accompanying text (describing the third prong of Justice 
Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown, wherein “the President takes measures incompatible 
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he 
can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress over the matter”). 
178 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (providing examples of Congress’ 
attempt to reign in Presidential autonomy in classification and intelligence orders). 
179 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (describing Congress’ response to EPA v. 
Mink, in the form of the revised Freedom of Information Act, and the court’s subsequent 
failure to grant access to plaintiffs seeking information classified by executive order). 
180 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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plain from the language of the statute.  The following text is an excerpt of 
FOIA with proposed language making Congress’ intentions clear in 
italics: 
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are— 
(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria 
established by an Executive order to be kept 
secret in the interest of national defense or 
foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly 
classified pursuant to such Executive order[] as 
determined by a in camera judicial review with 
significant, but not absolute, deference given to 
executive determinations181 
Though the policy debate behind any change to FOIA is beyond the 
scope of this Note, the FOIA example illustrates the care with which 
Congress must undertake to restrain the President’s power in issuing 
executive orders.  If Congress wishes to decrease the President’s 
autonomy in issuing any type of executive order, its intent must be made 
plain from the language of the statute so that courts can later apply the 
correct prong of the Jackson Test and ensure that executive orders do not 
become abusive. 
B. Informing the Public:  Congress Should Codify Executive Orders that Have 
the Force and Effect of Law 
Because executive orders carry the force and effect of law, it is 
essential that more care be taken with their codification and 
organization.182  Improper notice of executive orders has long been a 
concern, dating back to the days before orders were even recorded and 
extending through the Great Depression when orders began having very 
real implications for individual Americans.183  Yet even today, when 
executive orders are published in the Federal Register and then 
published in the Code of Federal Regulations, they are not codified 
according to topic and included in the United States Code.184   
                                                 
181 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
182 See supra note 24. 
183 See supra note 72 and accompanying text (describing U.S. v. Smith, in which the 
government tried to prosecute an individual under an executive order that had been 
rescinded). 
184 While many old executive orders are codified into a separate document, known as the 
CODIFICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS, they are 
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Just as the government has a non-discretionary duty to publish 
statutes, so too should it have a non-discretionary duty to publish and 
codify executive orders having the force and effect of law, so that 
Congress and the public are on notice of important, as well as abusive, 
executive orders.  Such notice can only increase oversight of executive 
orders, ensuring that they do not become mechanisms for abuse.  
Accordingly, Congress should mandate the codification of executive 
orders so that measures that have the force and effect of law are elevated 
to the same importance as statutory laws.  For example, the following 
text is the language of §106(a) of the first title of the United States Code, 
establishing the method for publication of Statutes, with proposed 
changes in italics: 
§ 106a.  Promulgation of laws 
Whenever a bill, order, resolution, or vote of the Senate 
and House of Representatives, having been approved by 
the President, or not having been returned by him with 
his objections, becomes a law or takes effect, or whenever 
the President issues an executive order having the force 
and effect of law, it shall forthwith be received by the 
Archivist of the United States from the President. . . and 
he shall carefully preserve the originals.185 
Though the mere publication of an executive order may seem trivial, 
it would serve to elevate those executive orders that carry the same 
weight as statutes to the same level as statutes.186  Such a change would 
result in more awareness among both members of Congress and the 
public as to what effect executive orders have on a particular area of the 
law.  This would, in turn, lead to greater oversight and lessen the 
chances that Presidents will be able to issue abusive executive orders 
without consequence.   
C. Framing the Debate:  Congress Must Critique Executive Orders in Terms 
of the Power Itself, not the President Exercising the Power 
Executive orders are often debated in highly politicized 
atmospheres, with loyalty following party lines and attacks centering 
                                                                                                             
nonetheless not included in the UNITED STATES CODE alongside statutes.  See CODIFICATION 
OF PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS (1989). 
185 1 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
186 See supra note 68 (noting that Harvard Professor Erwin Griswold called for an official 
gazette that would serve as notification to the public of executive orders in the 1930s). 
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less on the merits of an order and more on a specific President.187  Rather 
than debating whether Presidents ought to have the power to issue 
binding orders at all, members of Congress simply attack the individual 
President who issued the order.188  For this reason, abusive orders are 
more associated with the President who issued the order than with the 
institution of executive orders.189 
In the future, if Congress wishes to restrain the President’s ability to 
issue executive orders, it should frame the debate in terms of the power 
itself, not the President exercising the power.  By questioning the practice 
of issuing executive orders Congress would, in turn, focus the media and 
the public debate upon the great power that executive orders grant 
Presidents, resulting in increased oversight.  Such increased oversight 
into executive orders would still allow the President the power to issue 
important and expedient orders, while making it less likely that an order 
will be used for Presidential abuse and tyranny.   
V.  CONCLUSION  
For two centuries, executive orders have allowed Presidents to 
exercise enormous power.  At times, that power has been used to 
implement important measures to advance the country.  At other times, 
executive orders have bred scandal and national shame.  Upon closer 
examination of 200 years of Constitutional dialogue among the three 
branches of government concerning how much unilateral power a 
President ought to have, however, it becomes clear that although 
executive orders may appear tyrannical based on the broad power they 
afford Presidents, in practice executive orders are useful tools of the 
Presidency, able to be checked by Congressional oversight and 
controlled by the Court.  If correctly wielded, such Congressional and 
judicial oversight can guarantee that executive orders will not allow 
Presidents to become the despots so feared by the founding generation.  
Instead, by moving out of the zone of twilight and exercising proper 
oversight, Congress and the Court can ensure that the President is able to 
                                                 
187 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’ reaction to the Steel 
Seizure Case). 
188 See supra note 61 accompanying text (discussing Congress’ reaction to the Teapot 
Dome scandal). 
189 Sometimes, a Congressional reaction can be both political and based on policy.  See, 
e.g., Trussel, supra note 87, at A1 (noting that following the steel seizure, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee had measures on its docket to impeach or censure President Truman, 
a decidedly political response that would achieve a policy oriented goal). 
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administer the executive branch effectively, pass measures quickly, and 
occasionally rise above political divisions and do the right thing.   
Alissa C. Wetzel190 
                                                 
190 J.D. Candidate, Valparaiso University School of Law, 2008; M.S., International 
Commerce and Policy, Valparaiso University, 2005; B.A., Political Science, Butler 
University, 2004.  Reflecting back on his early years, Harry Truman once said, "I've had a 
few setbacks in my life, but I never gave up."   McCullough, infra note 81, at 141.  I haven't 
given up either, and I would like to thank a few of the reasons why.  Thank you to my 
favorite professors, David S. Mason and the late Dale Hathaway, who taught me both 
political realism and idealism.  Thank you to Ashley, Carrie, Daniel, and Rickey for making 
me smile every day.   And finally, thank you to my wonderful family—Mom, Dad, Angie, 
and Chad—who makes it all worthwhile.  
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